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Abstract
Cryptography is essential for secure communication in the digital era. Today, public-
key cryptography is widely employed, and has provided an efficient method for encrypting
content and ensuring both confidentiality and authenticity of electronic communications.
However, the security of these systems is based on assumptions of computational hard-
ness within the constraints of current computing capability. Thus, as quantum computing
becomes a reality, public-key algorithms will be genuinely vulnerable to attack. By con-
trast, quantum cryptography, which is based on quantum physics instead of mathematical
assumptions, is able to achieve information-theoretic security.
Advances in practical quantum cryptographic systems have not kept pace with theory,
where an eavesdropper can relatively easily exploit loopholes in practical implementations
to compromise theory-proved security. Bridging the gap between perfect theory and imper-
fect practice has become a priority for the growing field of quantum key distribution (QKD),
which has strived to strengthen the practical security of QKD systems. Among all the coun-
termeasures against quantum hacking, the measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD
protocol is promising because it is immune to all side-channel attacks on measurement
devices. However, the MDI QKD protocol has some limitations that critically restrict its
practical usefulness. Technically, the MDI scheme is not compatible with existing QKD
systems, and produces a low key rate. In addition, the theory underlying MDI QKD se-
curity is based on the use of trusted source stations. Thus, this protocol is not a universal
solution. This thesis further investigates the practical security of quantum cryptography
in and beyond MDI quantum cryptography.
To overcome the technical limitations of MDI QKD, we first evaluate two other coun-
termeasures against imperfect detections. The first is an industrial patch based on random
detection efficiency, recently implemented by ID Quantique in the commercial Clavis2 QKD
system. While powerful, experimental testing shows that this countermeasure is not suffi-
cient to defeat the detector blinding attack. The second countermeasure aims to achieve a
higher key rate than MDI QKD while maintaining the same security properties. However,
our research shows that detector-device-independent (DDI) QKD security is not equivalent
to that of MDI QKD and, further, that DDI QKD is insecure against detector side-channel
attacks.
While this initial work points to the superior performance of MDI QKD systems, core
challenges remain. The fundamental security assumption adopted for MDI QKD systems,
regarding the exclusive use of trustable source stations, cannot always be satisfied in prac-
tice. Our study revealed several side channels of source devices. The first is disclosed
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from the implementation of a decoy-state protocol, which is widely used in QKD systems
with weak coherent sources. The pump-current-modulated intensities result in a timing
mismatch between the signal and decoy states, violating the key assumption in the decoy-
state QKD protocol. Moreover, an active Eve can break the basic assumption about photon
numbers in the QKD system. In this work, we experimentally demonstrate a laser seeding
attack on the laser source, which shows that Eve can increase the emission power of the
laser diode. Furthermore, by shining a high-power laser into an optical attenuator, Eve
can decrease the attenuation values. The increase in laser emission power and the decrease
in attenuation leads to an increase in mean photon numbers.
In summary, MDI QKD is a milestone in quantum cryptography. However, this thesis
indicates the importance of continued investigations into the practical security of MDI
QKD. The analysis of practical security should be extended to other countermeasures
against side-channel attacks and the source stations in MDI QKD systems. Practical
quantum hacking and security analysis promote the development of quantum cryptographic
systems, which will eventually achieve the unconditional security claimed in theory.
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1.1 Quantum cryptography (QC)
1.1.1 Why quantum cryptography?
Information is invisible but valuable property. Information security guarantees that only
authorized users have access to precise and integrated information when requested [1].
Locally preserving information security is easy and feasible by setting a protection zone.
However, maintaining security properties during information transmission is challenging,
as it is difficult to guard the entire transmitting channel, particularly when it is long.
Cryptography is therefore applied to protect information from unauthorized disclosure in
transit.
Cryptology is the art of code-making and code-breaking. Once an encryption code
is made, code breakers attempt to defeat it. Subsequently, code makers propose new
types of code to replace broken ones. This centuries-old battle to maintain the security of
confidential information, on the one hand, and exploit vulnerabilities in that security. On
several occasions, this competition changed the course of human history. An often-cited
example was the breaking of Axis’ codes, including the famous German Enigma machine,
which was instrumental to ending World War II two years earlier than predicted [156].
Though that war is over, the war between code makers and code breakers continues. For
code makers, inventing a truely unbreakable cryptography is the ultimate goal to achieving
information security. Given the unprecedented power of quantum computing, this is a
colossal task.
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Today, cyber technology is one of the fastest growing industries worldwide, and the
Internet has spread to a global scale. With pervasive adoption of modern information
and communication technologies, cybersecurity is essential. Cryptography is a vital tool
for achieving information security in a cyber environment, particularly when untrusted
network channels are used. Public-key cryptography currently satisfies the requirements
of security in our digital economy. The ease of creating and distributing key pairs using
public-key algorithms makes them a convenient solution for ensuring secure authentication
and nonrepudiation [130].
The security of public-key cryptographic systems relies on unproven computational
assumptions, yet it is reasonable to believe that the currently-used public-key systems
are unlikely to be cracked by current computing capability. However, a mathematical
assumption is not a foundation that can be relied upon forever. For example, RSA (Rivest-
Shamir-Adleman), a widely used public-key algorithm, relies on the difficulty of factoring:
it is easy to multiply two large prime numbers, but it is assumed to be difficult to factor
them. The difficulty is based on today’s computational and algorithmic capability. The
advent of quantum computation poses a significant threat to this assumption. Quantum
computers will have the computational power to run Shor’s algorithm [154] to factor large
numbers in a reasonable period of time, rendering the RAS protocol vulnerable.
Quantum computing will usher in a new era for computation and information security.
Once the universal quantum computer is available, the cryptographic systems based on
mathematical assumptions will become vulnerable. This may become a reality in just a
few decades. Should we start considering the capability and threat of quantum computers
even now? Michele Mosca’s theorem [129] answers this question. Let us assume that we
need to secure our secret information for x years, and it will take y years to re-tool the
existing cryptographic infrastructure with a large-scale quantum-safe solution. Building a
large and universal quantum computer will take z years. The theorem says that if x+y > z,
we should worry about the threat from quantum computing right now.
To counter the threat from quantum computers, we must replace our cryptographic in-
frastructure with quantum-safe technology. There are currently two “quantum-safe” candi-
dates with potential to provide security against quantum attacks [2]. One is post-quantum
cryptography, a conventional cryptographic system that, while based on mathematical as-
sumptions, is believed to be secure against quantum attacks. However, this statement may
need more solid proof. The second candidate is quantum cryptography, which is based on
quantum mechanics, and is not limited by computational assumptions. Quantum cryptog-
raphy can be immune to quantum attacks and, therefore, can achieve information-theoretic
security.
2
1.1.2 What is quantum cryptography?
Quantum cryptography is the science and art of exploiting quantum mechanics to ful-
fill cryptographic objectives. There are many quantum cryptography primitives, includ-
ing (but not limited to): quantum key distribution (QKD) [35], quantum digital sig-
nature (QDS) [69], quantum random number generator (QRNG) [81], quantum secret
sharing (QSS) [49], quantum coin tossing (QCT) [35], quantum secure direct communi-
cation (QSDC) [55], quantum oblivious transfer (QOT) [37], and blind quantum comput-
ing (BQC) [44]. With a strong foundation in quantum physics, including Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle, no-cloning theorem, and quantum entanglement, quantum cryptog-
raphy has potential to achieve information-theoretic, or unconditional, security.
As the best-known application of quantum information for cryptography, QKD [35]
(invented in 1983) took the spotlight and has seen rapid development in the past two
decades. Remarkably, several QKD protocols have been proved to be unconditionally
secure (in theory) by rigorous security proofs [70,109,155], and has even been implemented
over long distances in free space [152] and optical fibers [106,144]. In the security model, an
eavesdropper is allowed to have unlimited computational power, even a quantum computer,
but is restricted by the laws of physics. The security of QKD also follows Kerckhoffs’s
principle [89], which states that Eve knows the entire protocol and system, except for the
shared key.
To introduce the working mechanism of QKD, we take the well-known Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84) protocol [35] as an example. The convention in cryptography is to refer to
the information sender as Alice, the receiver as Bob, and the eavesdropper as Eve. The
phases of the BB84 protocol are the following:
• State preparation. Alice prepares a string of quantum states, which are randomly
selected fromX basis or Z basis. For instance, she chooses the polarization of photons
as the encoding bases: horizontal (|H〉) and vertical (|V 〉) polarizations as X basis
and diagonal (|+〉), and anti-diagonal (|−〉) polarizations as Z basis. Among these
four quantum states, |H〉 and |+〉 correspond to bit 0; |V 〉 and |−〉 project to bit 1.
Thus, Alice randomly and independently picks one of four quantum states for every
slot in the bit string.
• Transmission. Alice transmits the prepared quantum states via a quantum channel,
which is an optical fiber or free space.
• State measurement. Once the states reach Bob’s side, he also randomly selects X
basis or Z basis to measure them. Quantum mechanics shows that when Alice and
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Bob select the same basis, they obtain the same bit value from the quantum state
with certainty, whereas if they choose different bases, they may get opposite bit values
with 50 % probability.
• Sifting. To exclude the cases of bases mismatch, they communicate via a classical
authenticated public channel to announce their basis choices. Then they keep only
the slots in which they choose the same bases, and discard the rest. The kept part
is called the ‘sifted key’.
• Parameter estimation. Alice and Bob take a small part of the sifted key and announce
their exact bit values. Due to channel noise or Eve’s disturbance, the bit values may
not match perfectly, which is treated as an error. By calculating the error rate among
these disclosed bits, Alice and Bob can regard the value of the error rate as a reference
for the rest of the secret bits. If the error rate is higher than a preset threshold, the
protocol aborts. Otherwise, Alice and Bob continue to the next phase.
• Error correction. To correct the small fraction of errors, Alice and Bob apply an
error correction algorithm in this phase. After error correction, ideally, Alice and Bob
obtain the identical bit string at each end. During error correction, some information
about the secret key is disclosed over the public channel.
• Privacy amplification. Eve eavesdrops the key during the transmission, and some
secret information is announced in the last step. Thus, Alice and Bob apply privacy
amplification to squeeze out the information that Eve may know. After this phase,
Alice and Bob finally share the secret key.
Please note: The QKD protocol requires an authenticated channel as the public channel.
Thus it ensures that Alice communicates with a real Bob, but not Eve, to avoid man-in-
the-middle attacks. Once the secret key is established by QKD, it can be applied to any
encryption algorithm. However, unconditional security can only be achieved if the secret
key is used in a one-time pad algorithm to transmit the message. This is true as long as
the secret key is never reused.
1.2 Practical quantum key distribution (QKD)
1.2.1 Experimental implementations
The first QKD system, which ran the BB84 protocol, was realized in 1989 [36]. Over the
past 29 years, various types of QKD protocols have been implemented in the lab and even
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in the field.
In practice, optical fibers and free space are used as quantum channels to transmit
quantum states. Quantum states can be defined in several different degrees of freedom of a
photon. As previously mentioned, polarization is a typical degree of freedom that is used in
free-space QKD systems [34,46,99,100,152]. For fibre-based QKD, one often chooses phase
encoding [66, 159, 163], frequency encoding [41], and time-bin encoding [107, 170]. Polar-
ization encoding is subject to birefringence in the fibers, which affects its stability [174].
Weak coherent sources are commonly used in practical QKD systems. To satisfy the
requirement of a single photon, an attenuator usually follows the weak coherent source. A
decoy-state BB84 system with this type of weak coherent source can reach transmission
distance of about 140-200 km [106, 152]. It is remarkable that, in recent years, demon-
strations based on measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD can reach distances up
to 300-400 km over optical fibers [169, 182]. If Alice and Bob wish to extend to a longer
distance, another option is entanglement-based QKD protocols [58, 119, 137], which can
tolerate around 70 dB loss. In this protocol, an untrusted entanglement source is applied
to distribute entangled states between Alice and Bob. They measure the entangled states
to obtain the shared information. However, this approach generates only relatively low
secure key rates.
Other solutions that can generate a high key rate in a short distance (below 100 km)
are distributed-phase-reference QKD protocols, which include the differential-phase-shift
protocol [78,163] and the coherent-one-way protocol [158,160]. In these protocols, informa-
tion is encoded in the coherence between adjacent pulses, instead of individual pulses. For
the receiver, Bob uses a Mach-Zehnder interferometer to check the coherent information.
In the coherent-one-way protocol, Alice also changes the intensities of the pulses. Bob
detects different intensities to get bit information.
The protocols described above are discrete variable QKD protocols, which require
single-photon detectors to detect every individual photon. InGaAs/InP avalanche pho-
todiodes have been introduced and are widely used, but they demonstrate low detection
efficiency (about 10 – 20%) [66,92], thus limiting the secure key rate. Continuous-variable
QKD was proposed to overcome the limitations of single-photon detectors [71,86,140]. This
type of protocol now employs standard telecom p-i-n photo diodes and homodyne detec-
tion to measure light-field quadratures. As these protocols require only standard telecom
components and do not need single-photon detectors, they are suited for experimental
realization.
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1.2.2 Commercialization and globalization
As QKD implementation continues to mature, several companies have commercialized
QKD systems and related products [3].
ID Quantique (IDQ), a Swiss company with a significant presence in the quantum cryp-
tography market, has been producing commercial QKD systems since 2007. Their flagship
QKD implementation was used to encrypt the election data in Geneva in 2007 [4]. This
application worked reliably. Moreover, the company provides quantum-safe cryptography
solutions [5–7] to customers. For example, IDQ offers a hybrid encryption solution, merging
state-of-the-art 10 Gigabit Ethernet encryption with QKD [8]. The 10-Gigabit Ethernet
encryptors secure the backbone link between a company’s headquarters and a database
center, with one more layer of security provided by the QKD system.
In China, there are two other QKD companies, Qasky and QuantumCTek. Qasky offers
a decoy BB84 QKD system that employs the Faraday-Michelson (F-M) phase encoding
scheme [9], which is immune to channel disturbance and thus can operate stably. The
system is available to work at 20 MHz [10], 50 MHz [10] or 1 GHz repetition frequency [11].
Qasky also offers several services: point-to-point secure transmission [12], QKD network
based on an optical switch [13], and a real-time full-access network [14]. Qasky customers
include power-grid industries, banks, and government.
QuantumCTek is rapidly developing in the field of commercialized quantum information
technology, and is now the world’s largest manufacturer and provider of quantum-safe
products and services. QuantumCTek is committed to providing competitive quantum-
safe solutions in telecom infrastructure, enterprise networks, cloud computing, big data
technology, and its services [15]. The solutions, products, and services are provided to
government, financial institutions, and energy industries [16]. They are also the product
supplier of the Beijing-Shanghai QKD backbone link [17]. So far, more than one thousand
QuantumCTek quantum secure products have been manufactured and are running online,
securing communication links longer than 4000 km [18].
As point-to-point QKD can transmit a secret key only in the range of several hundreds
of kilometers, a QKD network is one solution to securely extend the distance. Significant
efforts all over the world have been put into QKD networks and advance QKD globalization.
In 2003, the European Union launched a project, the Development of a Global Network
for SEcure COmmunication based on Quantum Cryptography (SECOQC) [134], which
aimed to enhance the practical applications of QKD. Forty-one research and industrial
organizations participated in this project. An eight-point network was formed based on
the trusted-node scheme [134]. The point-to-point links were built by various types of
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QKD technology: plug-and-play systems, a one-way weak pulse system, a coherent-one-
way system, an entangled photons system, a continuous-variables system and a free-space
system.
In the UK, a quantum technology hub for quantum communications [19] was established
in 2014, linking 8 UK universities and several companies, including BT, Toshiba Research
Europe Ltd, and the National Physical Laboratory. The Hub partnership mainly focuses on
three areas to provide technology prototypes: the UK’s first quantum network; chip-scale
integration of QKD modules; and short-range QKD to guarantee secure communication
between low-cost personal devices and services [20]. The hub aims at the commercialization
and affordability of QKD [21].
The European Commission recently announced an ambitious flagship programme to be
launched in 2018, in which e1 billion will be granted [62]. The initiative is expected to
turn Europe’s research in key areas such as quantum communication, quantum sensing,
quantum simulation, and quantum computing into real technological opportunities, which
can be taken up by industry [22]. For quantum communication, this programme aims to
address long-distance communication in ways that will enable QKD networks in metro
areas and ranges larger than 1000 km [143].
In Korea, the company, SK Telecom, has developed a QKD network based on trusted
repeaters, reaching a distance of 112 km [23]. In 2016, the company applied quantum
cryptography technologies to a commercial LTE network in Sejong city [24]. In February
2017, SK Telecom started a collaboration with Nokia and Deutsche Telekom to develop
secure communication using quantum cryptography [24]. SK Telecom is currently planning
to build a quantum network to share a quantum key between Seoul and Busan (about
460 km) [24]. Five trusted repeaters will be employed.
In Japan, a live demonstration of the Tokyo QKD network was delivered in 2010 [149].
A real-time encrypted video conference, including the detection of an eavesdropper and
a quantum link switch, was shown [149]. This project involved both domestic partners
(NICT, NEC, NTT, Mitsubishi Electric) and international participants (Toshiba Research
Europe, ID Quantique, University of Vienna, etc.) [25]. A three-layer structure was applied
based on trusted nodes: a quantum layer, a key management layer, and a communication
layer [149].
To communicate over longer distances than that is currently possible through fiber-
based QKD networks, satellites can be introduced as middle nodes in the network. This
idea was first realized by China, which is becoming a leader in quantum communica-
tion. China launched a quantum satellite named Micius in 2016 [26, 84]. The satellite
has successfully completed three tasks: 1200-km entanglement distribution [186], quantum
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teleportation [142], and QKD [99]. The quantum satellite has also established the key
crossing continents between China and Austria [98]. This shared key supported a video
call between Beijing and Vienna [98].
In April 2017, the Government of Canada announced an $80.9 million grant over five
years to support space-related research [27]. One of the major projects is a demonstration
of applications of quantum technologies in space, which involves the Institute for Quantum
Computing (IQC) at University of Waterloo [27]. This project aims to position Canada as a
leading player in quantum encryption. The goals of this project are to achieve more secure
communications, more reliable government services and greater protection of Canadians’
privacy.
As QKD enters the initial phases of commercialization and globalization, standardiza-
tion has become a growing concern. The Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)
is aware of this demand and has organized an Industry Specification Group (ISG) to work
on a QKD international standard [28]. ISG-ETSI brings together important parties from
science, industry, and commence to address standardization issues in quantum cryptogra-
phy, and quantum technology in general. The ESTI white paper [2] about quantum safe
cryptography and security was published, providing a broad view of the task.
Today, governments and industries pay increasing attention to quantum-safe cryptogra-
phy in order to mitigate impending threats from quantum computing. Moreover, countries
all over the world are contributing to QKD technology development, with an emphasis
on improved performance and commercialization, but also international cooperation and
standardization.
1.3 Practical security of QKD
1.3.1 Quantum hacking
The unconditional security of QKD has been proven in theory [108]. QKD security proofs
are based on three factors, beginning with a solid foundation in the laws of quantum
physics. The proofs are trustable because they are logical and restrict. Importantly, the
proofs also incorporate assumptions and models of practical devices. Although, it should
be noted that these assumptions and models cannot precisely match real-life devices. For
example, some assumptions may not be satisfied in practice [114], or models might not
describe the overall characteristics of the practical QKD devices [117]. As we believe the
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theory is perfect, the mismatch between theory and implementation is due to practical
imperfections.
Practical implementation presents unique challenges. Imperfect equipment may dis-
close some loopholes, providing Eve opportunities steal the secret key without being no-
ticed. This is called quantum hacking. Quantum hackers attempt to exploit practical
imperfections to compromise the security of QKD. The possibility of quantum hacking
has been shown in research experiments and even commercial QKD systems [45, 61, 80,
117, 122, 146, 161, 168, 179]. However, quantum hacking remains at the scientific stage of
study, where scientific researchers publish analyses about practical imperfections and vul-
nerabilities to attacks (as opposed to real hacking). This work helps the entire research
community to better understand practical QKD systems. Most importantly, scrutinizing
practical security is a necessary phase during the battle-testing period. This flaw analy-
sis gradually enhances the practical security of QKD. From this point of view, quantum
hacking evaluates and verifies QKD implementations, especially for commercial systems.
In the standard prepare-and-measure QKD scheme, it is assumed that Eve only has
access to the quantum channel, but Alice (source of state preparation) and Bob (state
measurement) are in protected laboratories. However, Eve could try to break these as-
sumptions by exploiting flaws from the source or the measurement devices. For the source,
imperfect state preparation may leak information about the secret key [164,165,168,181].
For instance, the QKD protocol assumes that quantum states are indistinguishable in
the non-encoded degrees of freedom. However, imperfect encoding methods result in side
channels from which encoded states are partially distinguishable [132]. Secondly, it is
also assumed that Alice prepares the required quantum states correctly. Unfortunately,
practical preparation may introduce some errors due to imperfect devices or Eve’s distur-
bance [162]. To steal the information about the states, Eve can also actively perform the
Trojan-horse attack [63,79,172] on intensity modulators and phase modulators.
The measurement party is usually more vulnerable to quantum hacking than the source.
Since Eve sends everything in the same direction as Alice, it is difficult to protect mea-
surement devices from attacks by simply using an optical isolator. So far, a significant
number of attacks focus on single-photon detectors [45, 61, 115–118, 176]. For this reason,
single-photon detectors are regarded as the “Achilles heel” of QKD [111]. In fact, the vul-
nerabilities of single-photon detectors are the result of their complex working mechanism:
the detection is affected by incoming light and the control circuit. Therefore, Eve can
manipulate the intensity [117], the time [121,139], or the wavelength [96] of incoming light
to control the response of single-photon detectors. The detection also really depends on
the electronic control and processing, which could have loopholes that can be exploited by
Eve [176]. Due to the complex mechanism of the single-photon detector, it is challenging
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to fully characterize them in a security model, which can result in the serious attacks on
detectors.
1.3.2 Countermeasures
There are four main approaches to bridge the gap between perfect theory and imperfect
practice.
The first idea is to precisely characterize and describe the practical devices in math-
ematical models. Then the models can be included in the security proof to estimate the
real secure key rate based on an imperfect setup [180]. While this approach seems straight-
forward, developing models to fully match the behavior of QKD devices is rarely possible
because the components are complex. This approach is also limited by our understanding
of the devices. It is remarkable that even though it is hard to fully characterize all the
QKD components, there are ongoing efforts to consider as many imperfections as possible
into the security models as shown in Ref. [113,165,180].
Instead of considering all the characteristics of all components, an effective solution
to close the known loopholes is to patch them. More specifically, once one discovers a
new type of attack, a corresponding countermeasure against this attack can be proposed
and realized in an existing QKD system [103, 146]. This approach usually only requires
modifying the software or the hardware (sometimes both) of a current system. Thus,
patching loopholes is more feasible and more practical than the previous method. However,
the main drawback of patches is that they only prevent the known attacks. For potential
and unknown attacks, the countermeasures may fail [122, 148]. Furthermore, the patched
countermeasures themselves might open other loopholes, introducing one more layer of
security risk [146,148].
The third method is to apply device-independent QKD (DI QKD) [31, 127]. In this
protocol, Alice and Bob are not required to know how their devices work, but simply treat
their devices as “black boxes”. However, this protocol still incorporates some assumptions.
For example, true random number generators, trusted classical post-processing, and an
authenticated classical channel are needed. The key assumption is that there is no infor-
mation leakage from the devices. With these assumptions, the security of DI QKD has
been proven based on the violation of the Bell inequality [173]. This idea is exciting as it
can remove all known and potential side channels. Unfortunately, this protocol is hard to
realize with off-the-shelf technology, because it needs almost perfect single-photon detec-
tors [64]. Furthermore, even if it is realized, DI QKD can only achieve an extremely low key
rate [64]. An exciting news is that researchers realized the Bell inequality test that closes
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the non-locality loophole and the detection loophole in the same experiment [65, 72, 153],
which is a milestone of implementing DI QKD. Advanced technology in the future might
make DI QKD more practical.
The fourth solution is to eliminate as many security assumptions about the devices
as possible, but still keep some devices under protection. One of the most promising
candidates in this approach is measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI QKD; see
Sec. 2.4) [110]. MDI QKD removes all the assumptions about the measurement station,
which can even be held by Eve. In this way, the protocol is immune to all the side
channels of measurement devices [110]; these devices are treated as the weakest part of
a QKD system. The security of MDI QKD is equivalent to the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) based QKD protocol [77], as it is a time-reversed version of EPR-based QKD [110].
Remarkably, MDI QKD is also highly practical, and it can be realized by current technol-
ogy [54,107,136,145,166,167,169,170,182]. Additionally, the source stations of MDI QKD
still need to be in protected laboratories [110].
1.4 Motivation
The practical security of quantum cryptography has drawn much attention in the past
decade. Various types of quantum attacks were disclosed, and researchers proposed solu-
tions to tolerate such imperfections in quantum cryptography, especially in QKD. As most
of the discovered loopholes are from detectors, the MDI scheme is treated here as a viable
solution to get rid of the threat to vulnerable detectors (see Sec. 2.4).
However, is MDI the end of the story? Once we have a MDI QKD protocol as a tool,
can a QKD system reach the security level guaranteed by its theory? The obvious answer
is no, because MDI QKD technology is limited in critical ways. The MDI QKD protocol
is not compatible with other QKD protocols, which means it cannot be implemented in
existing QKD systems. Another technical bottleneck is the relatively low key rate compared
to standard prepare-and-measure QKD systems, because MDI QKD requires interference
from two individual sources and coincidence clicks as detection events. Most importantly,
MDI QKD is still based on an essential assumption: the source stations must be trustable.
This assumption may not hold in practice, which compromises the security of MDI QKD.
To further scrutinize the practical security of general quantum cryptographic systems,
several questions must be addressed (even after MDI quantum cryptography has been
proposed). (i) Except for MDI QKD, what countermeasure(s) can commercial companies
deploy in their current QKD systems to avoid detector loopholes? Is this countermeasure
11
robust enough? (ii) How could we tackle the technical limitations of MDI QKD? Is there
any other semi-DI protocol that achieves the same security performance as MDI QKD, but
is easier to realize than MDI QKD? (iii) How secure and trustable is the source? Is there
any imperfection in the source? Are there more possible attacks on the source? If new
types of attacks are discovered, how will they affect the security of MDI QKD?
This thesis is motivated by the above questions and explores their answers. By col-
laborating with ID Quantique, we first evaluate its countermeasure against a detector
blinding attack on the commercial Clavis2 plug-and-play QKD system. The counter-
measure is a patch that randomly changes the detection efficiency. We show that the
countermeasure is not sufficient to protect the system from the modified detector blinding
attack. Then, the second project shifts to verify the security of detector-device-independent
QKD (DDI QKD). DDI QKD claimed that its security is equivalent to MDI QKD, and this
protocol is easier to realize than MDI QKD with a high key rate. However, our research
proves that DDI QKD is insecure for detector-control attacks, fundamentally violating
its security statement. For the source, we investigate the implementation of decoy-state
QKD and show experimentally that the source is imperfect. The partially distinguishable
signal state and decoy state compromise the security of QKD. Apart from the protocol’s
inherent imperfection, we experimentally show two active attacks: laser seeding attack on
laser diodes and laser damage attack on optical attenuators, in which Eve injects different
amounts of light into the source to create loopholes.
1.5 Outline
The remaining chapters of the thesis are organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides related
background, including theoretical attacks, practical attacks based on imperfect equipment,
and MDI QC as a countermeasure. Chapter 3 presents the counterattack on the random-
detector-efficiency countermeasure against the detector blinding attack. In Chapter 4, DDI
QKD security is directly evaluated and compared against the MDI QKD protocol. Several
practical hacking strategies to crack the security of DDI QKD are presented. In Chapter 5,
the imperfections in the implementations of the decoy-state protocol are investigated, and
a modified security model to tolerate these imperfections is given. In Chapter 6, a laser
seeding attack is presented as a tool for Eve to increase the mean photon number of the
source. In Chapter 7, a laser damage attack on various attenuators is presented. The
experimental results show that this attack is likely to decrease the value of attenuation,
which also breaks the assumption about the mean photon number in the QKD system.
Chapter 8 briefly introduces two other projects I participated in. In Chapter 9, the thesis
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is concluded with an outlook on potential future work.
1.6 List of contributions
1. Counterattack on the random-detector-efficiency countermeasure.
To protect the deployed QKD system from the detector-control attacks, especially
the detector blinding attack, a countermeasure that randomizes the detection effi-
ciency was proposed. The first project tested and evaluated this countermeasure
implemented in the ID Quantique Clavis2 commercial QKD system. I performed the
original and modified detector blinding attacks with help from Shihan Sajeed and
Poompong Chaiwongkhot. The experimental results show that this countermeasure
is not sufficient to defeat the detector blinding attack. I scrutinized the processes
in the gated detector supervised by Vadim Makarov. I also theoretically analyzed
the general conditions for a successful blinding attack with assistance from Vadim
Makarov. The detailed description is provided in Chapter 3, and the results are
published in Ref. [73].
2. Insecurity of detector-device-independent quantum key distribution.
DDI QKD was proposed and claimed that it is secure against all detector side-
channel attacks. However, in contrast to its security statement, I, along with Shihan
Sajeed, developed several attack strategies that showed DDI QKD is, in fact, in-
secure against detector side-channel attacks. I tested detector efficiency mismatch
under detector blinding attack and proposed the attack of exploiting an imperfect
beam splitter. Shihan Sajeed conceptualized the attacks exploiting trigger-pulse-
energy-threshold difference under different blinding conditions and imperfect phase
modulation. Shihan Sajeed and I contributed equally to this work. The details are
provided in Chapter 4, and the results are published in Ref. [147].
3. Decoy-state QKD with an imperfect source.
The decoy-state protocol is now widely used in QKD systems as a countermeasure
against the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack. However, the implementations
of the decoy-state protocol may have flaws. In this project, I investigated the pos-
sible imperfections in practice. I performed the measurement of two decoy-state
implementations: pump-current modulation and external modulation of the laser’s
intensity. The experiments show a timing side channel. Then, I modeled a PNS
attack with support from Zhihong Liu. I participated Shihai Sun in modifying the
security proof to tolerate a general imperfect source with distinguishable signal and
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decoy states. I applied the security model to the measured results and shown the
real secure key rate under the practical imperfections. The details of this project are
provided in Chapter 5.
4. Laser seeding attack on the source. For a QKD system that employs a weak
coherent laser source, a value of mean photon number is designed and fixed during
QKD operation. However, this designed mean photon number may be manipulated
by Eve. In the fourth project, I performed a laser seeding attack with assistance
from Shihai Sun and Poompong Chaiwongkhot. It experimentally showed that Eve
could increase the output power of the weak coherent laser in Alice. I conducted
the initial and basic security analysis of a decoy-state BB84 QKD system under this
attack. More specific description of this project is in Chapter 6.
5. Laser damage attack on the source. In Alice’s apparatus, an optical attenuator
is usually the last component the signal passes through before being transmitted via
a quantum channel. The attenuator is used to attenuate light intensity to a single-
photon level. However, I found that Eve can shine a high-power laser to modify
the attenuation. I first analyzed the optical-power handling capacity of a single-
mode fiber. Then I, along with Ruoping Li, tested three types of attenuators: a
fixed attenuator, a microelectromechanical system-based (MEMS-based) attenuator,
and a manual variable attenuator. The experimental results show that Eve has a
chance to decrease the value of attenuation, which leaks more photons from Alice. To
further investigate the MEMS attenuator, I supervised Ruoping Li and participated
in the testing of actual attenuation boards in a QKD system. The results still show
the possibility of decreasing attenuation. The details of this project are described
in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Background of quantum hacking
Cryptanalysis studies the capability of cryptography focusing on investigating the weak-
nesses therein. In quantum cryptography, a specific term “quantum hacking” is widely used
to represent the cryptanalysis in which Eve’s ability is allowed by quantum mechanics. In
this chapter, theoretical and practical attacks on quantum cryptography are introduced.
As a remarkable countermeasure against detector side channels, the idea of MDI QKD is
also presented.
2.1 Individual attack, collective attack, and coherent
attack
In theory, Eve’s attack strategies are classified into three families. The first family is
called individual attack [60]. In this type of attack, Eve is limited to probing each qubit
independently and measuring it one after the other. The individual attack also requires that
Eve must perform her measurement before post-processing. This attack is the simplest one
because it does not need any quantum memory. An important sub-family is the intercept-
resend attack that is applied in many practical attacks. I will explain this subfamily in
detail in the next section.
Another family of attack is collective attack [40]. In this attack, Eve still probes each
qubit independently, but she can keep her probes in the quantum memory. Later, after
post-processing, or whenever it is convenient for her, Eve performs an optimal measure-
ment to obtain the maximum amount of information. Please note that in the collective
18
attack, Eve is allowed to measure several probes coherently, which constitutes collective
measurement.
The last family of attack is coherent attack [39], in which Eve can probe and measure
qubits coherently. Generally speaking, Eve is allowed to perform any attack allowed,
only restricted by the laws of quantum mechanics. The hacking strategies are various,
e.g., Eve can entangle with qubits transmitted from Alice to Bob, or she can adjust her
attack strategy according to intermediate measurement results. By optimizing the hacking
strategy, she can obtain as much information as possible.
2.2 Intercept-resend attack
As aforementioned, the intercept-resend attack [34] is a typical and simple individual at-
tack. In this attack, Eve first intercepts the qubits individually and measures each of them
in her interception basis. She then prepares new states according to her measurement re-
sults and resends them to Bob. Being that Eve chooses measurement bases independently
without any information about Bob’s bases choices, she indeed introduces some errors into
the sifted key. The simplest attack for Eve is to measure the qubit in a basis selected
randomly between the bases used by Alice. For example, Eve can perform this attack
in the BB84 protocol [35]. After the raw key exchange and the sifting, Alice and Bob
keep the slots if they choose the same bases, while Eve can only correctly guess half of
them. The correct guesses allow Eve to precisely measure Alice’s states and resend them
to Bob, which introduces no error. For the other half of the slots, Eve chooses different
bases from Alice’s, so the measurement results are inconclusive. The resent states result
in random detections at Bob’s side: half of them are correct, but the other half of them
are wrong. Therefore, Eve introduces 25% error overall in the sifted key, if there are no
other sources of error and noise. This intercept-resend attack makes secure key generation
become impossible in principle [51, 52].
It is wise to mention a fake-state attack here [117,123], as it is regarded as the modified
version of the intercept-resend attack. In particular, the intercept phase of this attack is
the same as that of the intercept-resend attack. However, instead of reconstructing and
resending original states to Bob, Eve can resend tailored states, e.g., stronger intensity,
different wavelengths, or different triggering time. In this way, Eve aims to control Bob’s
detection results by exploiting detectors’ flaws. This hacking strategy is usually combined
with other practical attacks to achieve better performance. I will show several specific
examples od practical attacks later in the next section.
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2.3 Attacks based on practical imperfections
The flaws in implementations can help Eve discover the secret key. More importantly,
by exploiting the practical imperfections, Eve’s attacks can be hidden from Alice and
Bob. Hence, they are not aware of the attacks. Several representative attacks based on
imperfect implementations will be explained in this section, since they are relevant to my
Ph.D. research.
2.3.1 Photon-number-splitting attack
In the ideal QKD protocol, a single-photon source is assumed. Unfortunately, implementing
the single-photon source is challenging. Instead, weak coherent sources are usually utilized
in practical QKD systems. The optical pulses are attenuated to a single-photon level
with a mean photon number µ < 1. Please note that the photon number distribution
of a weak coherent source follows a Poisson distribution, so there must be a portion of
pulses containing multiple photons. These multi-photon pulses leak the information about
prepared states to Eve. An attack named photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [34, 43,
75,114] exploits this flaw.
The specific steps of this attack are as follows. For every pulse sent from Alice, Eve first
performs quantum non-demolition measurement (QND) to know the photon number in the
pulse. Upon finding a multi-photon pulse, Eve splits one photon from the pulse and keeps
this photon in her quantum memory. The rest of the photons in this pulse are forwarded
to Bob. This operation does not disturb the states prepared by Alice, so it introduces
no error. For the pulses only containing a single photon, Eve blocks them. Thus, Bob
has no information about them at all. The split pulses have a weaker intensity, which is
equivalent to the loss during transmission. This loss can be compensated by replacing the
lossy channel with a lossless channel between Eve and Bob. In this way, Alice and Bob do
not notice the attack. After Bob measures each pulse and announces the basis he selects,
Eve measures the photon in her quantum memory by the same basis.
2.3.2 Detector-efficiency mismatch attacks
To measure two different bit values, there are usually at least two detectors in a QKD
system. To detect a single photon, InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are widely
used. This type of APD often works in a gated mode, which means that APDs are only
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Figure 2.1: Mismatch of detector efficiencies. Reprinted from [121].
sensitive to a single photon during the gated time. As the detection efficiency is time-
dependent, it is difficult to perfectly match the same detection efficiency from two different
detectors. This is so because of the inherent manufacturing difference and different optical
lengths coupled to detectors. The misalignment of the gate time causes the detector-
efficiency mismatch [121,139] as shown in Fig. 2.1.
The loophole of detector-efficiency mismatch allows Eve to perform a fake-state attack
to control Bob’s detection results. Instead of resending photons to Bob’s detectors in the
middle of a gate, shown by the position of the normal signal in Fig. 2.1, Eve shifts the
arriving time of the photons to the efficiency mismatch areas, in which one detector is more
sensitive than the other. For example, if Eve sends photons earlier than normal, she has
a higher chance of triggering Detector “0”. Conversely, the photons arriving at Bob later
than normal may trigger only Detector “1”, as it is shown in Fig. 2.1. Thus, by controlling
the arrival time of photons, Eve can control the detection results. Besides the time domain,
an efficiency mismatch could also exist in other degrees of freedom, e.g., the spectral and
spatial domains [132,146].
A time-shift attack also exploits the detector-efficiency mismatch, as was proposed in
Ref. [139] and experimentally verified in Ref. [189]. It is remarkable that this was the first
experimental attack on a commercial QKD system. Its principle is similar to that of the
attack described above. The main difference is that, instead of performing a faked-state
attack, Eve does not intercept the states, but just randomly shifts the arrival time of the
incoming photon by changing the length of the transmission fiber. This operation achieves
the same result as the fake-state attack described above. Thus, by manipulating the arrival
time, Eve can also control the detection results.
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Figure 2.2: Linear-mode and Geiger-mode APD operation (reprinted from [117]).
2.3.3 Wavelength-dependent attack
In the polarization-encoding QKD systems, as described in Sec. 1.1.2, a passive selection
of measurement bases is commonly used at Bob’s side [68, 74, 106, 152]. In this scheme,
a 50:50 beam splitter (BS) is applied to randomly pass the incoming photons to the X
basis (from output 1) or the Z basis (from output 2). This is an ideal case. However, in
practice, researchers find that the output splitting ratio of BS is not always 50:50 [96]. The
splitting ratio is however dependent on the wavelength. It has been shown in an extreme
case that the splitting ratio of the BS made by fused biconical taper technology is 98.6:1.4
at 1290 nm, while it becomes 0.3:99.7 at 1470 nm [96].
This changeable ratio can help Eve manipulate the detection results during the intercept-
resend attack. If Eve obtains a measurement result in the X basis, she resends the measured
results at 1290 nm to Bob. Thus, the resent states likely go through output 1 of BS and
are detected by Bob in the X basis as well. Conversely, if Eve measured in the Z basis,
she resends the states at 1470 nm. This results in a much higher chance of Bob’s detection
at the Z basis. The wavelengths are the tools for Eve to control the detection results at
Bob’s side actively. Please note that the detection efficiency is also wavelength-dependent.
To compensate for lower detection efficiencies at 1290 nm and 1470 nm, Eve resends the
states with higher intensities to obtain a similar detection efficiency at 1550 nm.
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2.3.4 Detector control attack
Most available single-photon detectors are InGaAs/InP APDs operating in a Geiger mode,
in which they are sensitive to a single photon [50]. The working principle of this type of
APDs is shown in Fig. 2.2. When the APD is reverse-biased above its breakdown voltage
Vbr, a single photon can cause a large current IAPD to flow. If this current exceeds the
threshold Ith, then the electronics register this as photon detection (a ‘click’). After that,
an external circuit quenches the avalanche by lowering the bias voltage VAPD below Vbr,
and then the APD goes into a linear mode. In the linear mode, IAPD is proportional to the
incident bright optical power Popt. The current threshold Ith then becomes a threshold on
the incident optical power Pth that makes a click [117].
If Eve sends a bright continuous-wave (c.w.) illumination to the gated detectors, then
the bright light makes the APD generate a significant photocurrent that monotonically
increases with Popt. This large current reduces the voltage across the APD VAPD [117].
If we apply enough illumination power, VAPD will be less than Vbr even inside the gate,
and the APD then always stays in the linear mode. Consequently, the detector becomes
blinded to single photons. After blinding Bob’s detectors, Eve can conduct a faked-state
attack. Eve first intercepts all photons sent by Alice. Whenever Eve detects a photon, she
sends the same state to Bob via a bright-light pulse with specific energy, superimposed on
her blinding illumination. Only if Bob chooses the same measurement basis as Eve and
applies the gate, does one of Bob’s detectors click, and he will get the same bit value as
Eve. Otherwise, there is no click at Bob’s side. During the sifting procedure, Alice and
Bob keep the bit values when they have chosen the same basis, and so does Eve. Therefore,
Eve has identical bit values to Bob, introduces no extra QBER, and does not increase the
alarm counter. Eve then listens to the public communication between Alice and Bob and
performs the same error correction and privacy amplification procedures as them to obtain
the identical copy of their secret key [117].
2.3.5 Laser damage attack
In QKD theory, there is no limitation on the power of Eve’s light. In other words, Eve
can send as much light as she wants to QKD systems. This strong light may change
the characteristics of some optical components employed in QKD systems, which is called
the laser damage attack [45, 122]. The effect of a high-power laser was first tested for
stand-alone APDs [45]. The testing shows that 1.2-1.7 W laser can permanently blind the
APDs, making them insensitive to single photons. Nevertheless, the blinded APDs are still
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sensitive to a certain amount of bright light. Thus, the detector control attack becomes
possible again.
To investigate the capability of laser damage attack on the practical QKD systems
further, a fiber-based plug-and-play QKD system and a free-space QKD system were
tested [122]. For the fiber-based system, the first component that the high-power laser
destroys at Alice’s side is a monitoring detector that monitors the energy of incoming
light [148]. The power above 1 W reduces the photosensitivity of the InGaAs p-i-n photo-
diodes. The power of 1.7 W can entirely damage the photodiodes, which means they lose
the capability to monitor the injected light. A Trojan-horse attack [63, 79, 172] then be-
comes possible. For the free-space QKD system, the first component destroyed is a spatial
filter, a pinhole. The 3.6 W laser enlarges the size of the pinhole, so it cannot restrict the
area and beam size of the incoming light. Without the protection of the pinhole, Eve can
exploit the efficiency mismatch in the spatial domain to hack the QKD system.
2.4 Countermeasure against detector control attacks:
measurement-device-independent QC (MDI QC)
2.4.1 Idea of MDI
The idea of measurement device independence is inspired by an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) based QKD protocol [38, 58]. In this protocol, Alice and Bob individually prepare
an EPR pair at each side and send one photon from each pair to an untrusted party,
Charles. Charles then performs a Bell state measurement (BSM) to swap entanglements.
The measurement result is announced. Once the BSM is finished, Alice and Bob measure
the other photon of the EPR pairs locally by randomly choosing between the X and Z
bases. Comparing a subset of their measurement results allows Alice and Bob to know
whether Charles is honest.
Importantly, the EPR protocol can also work in a “time-reversal” version [38], in which
the order of measurements is reversed. Thus, Alice and Bob can measure their local photons
first, instead of waiting for Charles’ measurement results. This order of preparation and
measurement is equivalent to that of the prepare-and-measurement QKD scheme in which
Alice and Bob prepare BB84 states [35] and send them to Charles to perform the BSM.
After that, the Charles’ honesty can still be checked by comparing a part of Alice’s and
Bob’s results. This time-reversal EPR protocol is the main concept behind MDI. The
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advantage of MDI QC is that it removes all detector side channels because the third-party
Charles who performs the measurement can be fully untrusted.
Moreover, the idea of MDI can be extended to a multi-party scenario [59]. Instead of us-
ing the EPR state, a Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) entangled state can be established
among multiple parties. Similar to the EPR version, the security of multi-party quantum
cryptography is based on post-selected GHZ states. The correlation in the GHZ entangled
state guarantees the security. This security is also independent of the measurement sta-
tion, which can be untrusted as well. Most importantly, this post-selected entanglement
scheme is applicable not to only QKD, but also to other quantum cryptographic protocols,
such as quantum digital signature (QDS) [185] and quantum cryptographic conferencing
(QCC) [48].
2.4.2 MDI QKD protocol
To understand the MDI QC further, I take the MDI QKD protocol [110] as an example
and explain it in detail. The MDI QKD protocol can be divided into several phases:
Phase I: Alice and Bob randomly and individually prepare one of four BB84 states [35].
They then send the states to an untrusted party, Charles.
Phase II: An honest Charles performs a BSM that makes Alice’s and Bob’s states
interfere with each other, generating a Bell state. The quantum communication phases are
completed at this point. The rest of the phases use only the classical public channel.
Phase III: Whether Charles is honest or not, he announces the outcome of BSM when
he obtains a successful measurement.
Phase IV: Post-processing. Alice and Bob keep the data that corresponds to Charles’
successful measurement events and discard the rest. Next, similar to the sifting in BB84
protocol, Alice and Bob announce their basis choices for sifting the events and keep the
events using same bases. Based on Charles’ measurement result, Alice flips part of her bits
to guarantee the correct correlation with those of Bob.
MDI QKD protocol is very practical and can be implemented by current technology.
A typical implementation scheme based on polarization encoding is shown in Fig. 2.3.
In practice, Alice and Bob prepare phase-randomized weak coherent pulses (WCP) first.
Individual BB84 polarization states are independently and randomly modulated by a po-
larization modulator (pol-M). To protect the weak coherent source from the PNS attack,
a decoy state method [112] is applied with the help of an intensity modulator (decoy-
IM) [110]. Alice and Bob simultaneously transmit the prepared photons to Charles, and
25
Figure 2.3: Basic schematics of MDI QKD implementation. Reprinted from [110].
the photons interfere at a 50:50 beamsplitter (BS) at Charles’ station. Each output of the
BS is followed by a polarization beam splitter (PBS) that projects the incoming photons to
H or V polarization. Four single-photon detectors (D1H, D1V, D2H, and D2V) are employed
to detect the photons at each output of PBS.
In this case, a successful BSM corresponds to two detectors being triggered simultane-
ously. The detection combination of D1H and D1V , or D2H and D2V , means a projection
into the Bell state |ψ+〉 = 1/
√
2(|HV 〉 + |V H〉), while the combination of D1H and D2V ,
or D1V and D2H , indicates a projection into the Bell state |ψ−〉 = 1/
√
2(|HV 〉 − |V H〉).
Alice flip her bits to be identical to Bob’s. Only when Alice and Bob choose the diagonal
basis and the measured result is |ψ+〉, does Alice not flip her bits.
2.4.3 Limitations of MDI QKD
MDI QKD is indeed a milestone in the progress of quantum cryptography. It eliminates
the threat of imperfect detections. However, MDI QKD protocol still has some limitations.
One major concern from industry is how to apply it to commercial products. MDI QKD
is a new protocol that is not compatible with the existing QKD systems. Replacing all
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the deployed systems with MDI QKD systems is costly. Thus, instead of using MDI
QKD scheme, the industry should consider patching detection loopholes to strengthen the
existing QKD systems.
A technical drawback of MDI QKD is that it requires high-visibility two-photon interfer-
ence between two independent sources. This requirement makes its implementation more
demanding than that of conventional QKD schemes, as it is hard to maintain the identical
characteristics, e.g., wavelength, arrival time and pulse width, for two individual sources.
In addition, the current finite-key security analysis against general attacks [53] requires
larger post-processing data block sizes of MDI QKD than those of standard prepare-and-
measure QKD, even though recent proposals [190] significantly improve the performance
of MDI QKD in the finite-key regime. These two technical obstacles limit the secure key
rate of MDI QKD.
There is no doubt that the MDI QKD scheme can remove all security assumptions
about the detection devices. Thus, it eliminates all detector side channels from QKD im-
plementations, which are regarded as significant imperfections in the QKD system. Please
note that an essential assumption in MDI QKD is that the source stations are trusted.
That is, Alice and Bob are believed to be located at secure laboratories under protection
and fully know the prepared states. However, this assumption might not be satisfied in a
realistic scenario. Instead, Eve might exploit side channels of the sources, like imperfect
state preparation [132] and the active Trojan-horse attack [63,79,172], to compromise the






As one of the limitations of MDI QKD mentioned in the past chapter, it is hard to adapt
the deployed QKD systems to the MDI scheme. Alternatively, the solutions from industry
are attempting to patch the existing systems against specific attacks. Importantly, the
security of these patches should be verified. In this chapter, an example of testing the
security of an implemented countermeasure is given. I examine ID Quantique’s attempted
countermeasure to earlier discovered bright-light detector control attacks [117,118,177]. It
shows that the countermeasure can be counterattacked. This work is published in Ref. 73.
3.1 From loophole discovery to countermeasure im-
plementation
In 2009, the vulnerability of the commercial QKD system Clavis2 [29] to detector blinding
attacks was identified and a confidential report was submitted to ID Quantique (the work
was published shortly afterwards [117]). After this, ID Quantique has been trying to figure
out an experimental countermeasure against these attacks. The timeline of this security
problem is shown in Fig. 3.1. In 2010, ID Quantique proposed a countermeasure that
randomizes the efficiency of a gated avalanche photodiode (APD) by randomly choosing
one out of two different gate voltages, and filed this idea for a patent [30]. In this way, an
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2009-10-22 Original report about blinding attack sent to IDQ
2010-10-08 IDQ applies for a patent on the randomization




Lim et al. upload a preprint about full implementation
of countermeasure to arXiv:1408.6398
Simplified implementation of countermeasure delivered 
by IDQ to our lab (firmware update for Clavis2)
Testing report sent to IDQ proposing a modified attack 
that works
2004-11-10 First commercial Clavis1 system
is shipped to a customer
2015-12-21
Testing report sent to IDQ showing full implementation
of countermeasure to be unreliable
Figure 3.1: Timeline of hacking-countermeasure-hacking for the bright-light detector con-
trol class of attacks.
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eavesdropper Eve does not know the exact efficiency of Bob in every gated slot and thus
cannot maintain his detection statistics. At the sifting phase, if the observed detection
rates differ from the expected values, Alice and Bob would be aware of Eve’s presence and
discard their raw keys.
In 2014, Lim et al. proposed a specific protocol to realize this countermeasure [103],
which analyses the security mathematically for blinding attacks that obey a certain as-
sumption on their behaviour. In the protocol, Bob randomly applies two non-zero de-
tection efficiencies η1 > η2 > 0, and measures detection rates R1 and R2 conditioned
on these efficiencies. The effect of detector blinding attack is accounted via the factor
(η1R2 − η2R1) / (η1 − η2). Without the blinding attack, the detection rate is proportional
to the efficiency, making this factor zero. The analysis makes a crucial assumption that the
detection rate under blinding attack R1 = R2, i.e., it will be independent of Bob’s choice
of η1,2. Under attack the factor then will be greater than zero, and reduces the secure key
rate. This solution intends to introduce an information gap between Eve and Bob, for Eve
has no information about Bob’s random efficiency choice.
Later in 2014, ID Quantique implemented the countermeasure as a firmware patch.
The hardware in Clavis2 is not capable of generating two nonzero efficiency levels that
switch randomly between adjacent detector gates. As a result, implementation is in a
simple form by suppressing gates randomly with 2% probability. The suppressed gates
represent zero efficiency η2 = 0, while the rest of the gates represent calibrated efficiency
η1 = η. Ideally, in the updated system, there should be no click in the absence of the
gate. In practice, transient electromagnetic interference may extremely infrequently lead
to a click without a gate. Therefore, an alarm counter is used with the system lifetime
limit of 15 clicks in the absence of the gate. If this limit is reached, it triggers the firmware
to brick the system and requires factory maintenance. This implementation assumes that
under blinding attack [117], click probability should not depend on the gate voltage and
the attack should, therefore, cause clicks at the slots of gate absence.
3.2 Counterattack on the countermeasure
I demonstrate that the countermeasure presently implemented by ID Quantique is effective
against the original blinding attack [117], but not sufficient against the general class of
attacks attempting to take control of Bob’s single-photon detectors.
30




















Minimum energy level for
100% click probability in gate presence
Figure 3.2: Click probability under original blinding attack [117] versus energy of trigger
pulse.
3.2.1 Hack by the original blinding attack
Let me briefly remind the reader how Clavis2 and the original blinding attack against it
work. Clavis2 is a bidirectional phase-encoding QKD system [29, 159]. After Bob sends
multi-photon bright pulses to Alice, Alice randomly modulates one of the four BB84 phase
states [35], attenuates the pulses and sends them back to Bob. Bob randomly chooses
one out of two measurement bases. Interference happens between pulses from longer and
shorter paths of an interferometer at Bob’s side, and the outcomes of interference depend
on the phase difference between Alice’s and Bob’s modulation [131]. However, Eve is able
to control the outcomes by the following strategy. She shines a bright light to blind the
detectors, and then intercepts Alice’s states [117]. According to Eve’s interception results,
she re-sends faked states by multi-photon pulses to Bob’s blinded detectors. If Bob chooses
the same measurement basis as Eve’s, the pulses interfere at Bob’s interferometer, so that
all power of the pulse goes to one detector to trigger a click. If the measurement bases
chosen by Bob and Eve are mismatched, there is no interference, and the power of the pulse
is split equally between Bob’s two detectors. In this case, neither detector clicks. In this
attack, Eve can fully control Bob’s detectors and obtain the whole key tracelessly [117].
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For the original blinding attack, Eve sends bright-light continuous-wave (c.w.) laser
light to blind Bob’s detectors. A trigger pulse then is sent slightly after the gate to make a
click. I repeat this attack for an improved Clavis2 system and test the amount of energy to
trigger a click which is shown in Fig. 3.2. In this testing, the blinding power is 1.08 mW,
as the same as the power used in the published original attack [117]. The timing of trigger
pulse is 0.7 ns long, 3 ns after the center of the gate signal, which should roughly reproduce
the original attack [117]. From Fig. 3.2, we can see the trigger pulse energy for gate presence
(solid curves) is lower than that for gate absence (dashed curves), because minute electrical
fluctuations of APD voltage following the gate signal lower the click threshold slightly.
However, if Eve tries to trigger a click with 100% probability when the gate is applied,
this amount of trigger pulse energy (marked by a dotted vertical line in Fig. 3.2) also might
trigger a click with non-zero probability when the gate is suppressed, which is monitored
and results in an alarm. Therefore, Eve cannot hack the system with full controllability.
To avoid clicks in slots of gate suppression, Eve could, in theory, decrease the level of
trigger pulse energy to trigger a click sometimes with gate presence, but never with gate
absence. This also satisfies a necessary condition of a successful attack which we will discuss
in Sec. 3.3 later. Unfortunately, in practice, the testing result shows the amount of trigger
pulse energy required to trigger D0 without the gate is about 710 fJ, which is only 1.5%
less than the amount of energy for 100% click (720 fJ) when the gate is present. The 1.5%
difference of these two energy levels is likely not big enough to achieve a reliable attack
operation that avoids triggering the countermeasure. Also, D1 will always trigger at these
energy levels, revealing the attack. Eve could target D1 using a slightly lower energy level,
but the relative precision required is similar there. Routine fluctuations of temperature
and other equipment parameters may lead to some instability of these trigger pulse energy
levels, causing a risk for Eve to trigger a few clicks in the gate absence and brick the
system being attacked. From this point of view, we think this first implementation of
countermeasure is effective against the original blinding attack.
3.2.2 Hack by the modified blinding attack
I slightly modify the blinding attack to break the security of this countermeasure. Sim-
ilarly to the original blinding attack, Bob’s detectors are blinded by a bright-light laser
first. Then, instead of sending a trigger pulse slightly after the gate as in the original
attacks [117], I send a 0.7 ns long trigger pulse on top of the c.w. illumination during the
detector gate, as shown in Fig. 3.3. The relative time between the gate voltage transitions
and the optical pulse is approximate. The c.w. signal is generated by a 1536 nm laser diode;






































Figure 3.3: Idealized APD gate signal and real oscillogram of optical trigger pulse.
laser diode, using an electrical pulse generator [117]. This trigger pulse produces a click in
one of Bob’s two detectors only if Bob applies the gate and his basis choice matches that
of Eve; otherwise there is no click.
To explain why this modified attack succeeds, let me remind the reader the normal
operation of an avalanche photodiode (APD). The detectors in Clavis2 are gated APDs.
When the gate signal is applied, the voltage across the APD VAPD is greater than its
breakdown voltage Vbr. If a single photon comes during the gated time, an avalanche
happens and causes a large current. This current is converted into a voltage by the detector
electronic circuit. If the peak voltage is larger than a threshold Vth = 70 mV, the detector
registers a photon detection (a ‘click’). Fig. 3.4(a) and (b) show the cases of no photon
coming and a photon introducing an avalanche.
A bright laser is able to blind the APDs. Under c.w. illumination, the APD produces
constant photocurrent that overloads the high-voltage supply and lowers VAPD. Then, even
when the gate signal is applied, VAPD does not exceed Vbr and the APD remains in the
linear mode as a classical photodetector that is no longer sensitive to single photons. This
means the detectors become blinded.
Under the blinding attack with 0.56 mW c.w. illumination, Fig. 3.4(c–e) shows the
detector voltages in different cases: when (c) no trigger pulse is applied and when 0.32 pJ
33




















(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f )
Figure 3.4: Oscillograms at comparator input in the detector circuit, proportional to APD
current.
trigger pulse is applied either after (case (d)) or in the gate (case (e)). Since in the linear
mode the gain factor of secondary electron-hole pairs generation in the APD depends on
the voltage across it, the 3 V gate applied to the APD increases the gain factor. This larger
gain during the gated time assists the APD in generating a larger photocurrent than the
photocurrent outside the gate. Therefore the gate signal causes a positive pulse as shown
in Fig. 3.4(c). The trigger pulse applied after the gate produces a second pulse, but the
peak voltages of neither pulses exceed Vth [Fig. 3.4(d)]. However, when the trigger pulse is
shifted inside the gate, the two pulse amplitudes add up, reach Vth and produce a detector
click [Fig. 3.4(e)]. If Bob chooses a different measurement basis than Eve, only half of the
trigger pulse energy (0.16 pJ) arrives at each detector [117]. In this case, the peak voltage
does not reach Vth [Fig. 3.4(f)]. Overall, only when the trigger pulse is applied during
the gate time and Bob chooses the same basis as Eve, the detector under the blinding
attack clicks. As a result, Eve can control Bob’s detectors to make Bob obtain the same
measurement result as her, and does not introduce extra errors [117].
Contrary to most of previously demonstrated attacks attempting to take control of
single-photon detectors [115, 117, 118], in the present demonstration the timing of the




























Figure 3.5: Output of a blinded detector in Clavis2 under control of trigger pulses of
different energy.
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factor of the attack is the trigger pulse energy E. To test the effect of different trigger
pulse energies, I gradually increase it and observe the detection outcomes. Figure 3.5
shows schematically in which order clicks appear in Clavis2 as E is increased. The top
graph shows a gate applied at the first slot, but suppressed at the second slot. However, an
optical trigger pulse is sent to the detector in both slots. Graphs A–E show detector output
versus trigger pulse energy E. In graph A, the energy is insufficient to produce a click. As
the energy is increased above Egatenever,i, clicks intermittently appear in the presence of the
gate, as shown in graph B. At the energy level above Egatealways,i, the gate always has a click,
as shown in graph C. However, there is never a click when there is no gate. At a higher
energy level above Eno gatenever,i , clicks in the gate absence appear intermittently (graph D) or
always (graph E). I observe three thresholds.
• If E ≤ Egatenever,i (where i ∈ {0, 1} is detector number), the detector never clicks when
the gate is applied.
• If E ≥ Egatealways,i, the detector always clicks when the gate is applied.
• If E ≤ Eno gatenever,i , the detector never clicks when the gate is suppressed.
Figure 3.6 shows these detection thresholds measured for a range of c.w. blinding pow-
ers. All the thresholds rise with the blinding power, because higher blinding power leads to
a larger photocurrent and lower VAPD. The decreased VAPD leads to smaller gain and thus
lower sensitivity to the trigger pulse. As can be seen, for any given blinding power, Eno gatenever,i
is much higher than the other click thresholds. This easily allows the original detector
control attack [117] to proceed undetected by the countermeasure. A more formal analysis
will be stated in the next section.
3.3 Conditions of a successful attack
Experimental result of the previous section shows that the attack of Ref. 117 is possible in
Clavis2. However, general conditions for a successful attack should be analyzed theoreti-
cally. In this section, we first consider strong conditions for a perfect attack, in which Eve
induces a click in Bob with 100% probability if their bases match and the gate is applied,
and 0% probability otherwise. These conditions are definitely sufficient for a successful
attack [117]. However, as we remark later in this section, even if these strong conditions
are not satisfied, an attack may still be possible.
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Figure 3.6: Energy thresholds of trigger pulse versus c.w. blinding power. Shaded area
shows the range of trigger pulse energies of the perfect attack. The red × will be explained
in Sec. 3.4.
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Strong conditions. If the detection outcome varies as Fig. 3.5 with the increase of
trigger pulse energy, the order of the three thresholds is:





If Eve and Bob select opposite bases, half of the energy of trigger pulse goes to each
Bob’s detector. In this case, none of the detectors should click despite the gate presence.
















The random gate suppression imposes additional conditions. In case of basis mismatch,
half of the trigger pulse energy is arriving at each detector. It should induce a click in
neither detector when the gate signal is absent. For the target detector i, there is no click
once Eq. (3.1) is satisfied. For the other detector i⊕1, no click is achieved when half of the






If the bases match, we need to make sure there is no click when the gate is suppressed,
but always a click in the expected detector in the gate presence. This is achieved if
Egatealways,i < E
no gate
never,i , which is already included in inequality (3.1). Although inequality (3.3)
has a physical meaning, it mathematically follows from inequalities (3.1) and (3.2). Thus
satisfying inequalities (3.1) and (3.2) represents the strong attack conditions and guarantees
the same performance as in Ref. 117. The shaded area in Fig. 3.6 indicates a range of the
trigger pulse energies Eve can apply for the perfect attack. The range is sufficiently wide
to allow for a robust implementation, only requiring Eve to set correct energy with about
±15% precision.
Necessary condition. An attack may still be possible even if Eve’s trigger pulse does
not always cause a click in Bob when their bases match, and/or sometimes causes a click
when their bases do not match [116]. The latter introduces some additional QBER but
as long as it’s below the protocol abort threshold, Alice and Bob may still produce a key.
The random gate removal countermeasure imposes the condition
Eno gatenever,i > E
gate
never,i, (3.4)
which means Eve should be able to at least sometimes cause a click in the gate while never
causing a click without the gate (lest the alarm counter is increased). This is a necessary
condition for an attack. As the present paper details, there are strong engineering reasons
why this condition is likely to be satisfied in a detector. Additional conditions will depend
on exact system characteristics [116].
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3.4 Will a full implementation of the countermeasure
be robust?
I have proved so far that the current countermeasure with gate suppression cannot defeat
the detector blinding attack. However, the paper of Lim et al. [103] claims that the
full version of countermeasure with two non-zero detection efficiencies is effective against
a large class of detector side-channel attacks including the blinding attack [117]. Even
though this full countermeasure has not been implemented by ID Quantique, I have tested
some properties of the detectors in Clavis2 to show two possible methods to hack the full
countermeasure, based on certain assumptions about a future implementation.
Bob could choose randomly between P/2 and P detection efficiency by changing either
gate voltage amplitude Vgate or high-voltage supply Vbias [103]. Since in Clavis2 hardware
Vgate is fixed, we assume an engineer will change Vbias to achieve different non-zero detection
efficiencies. To achieve half of original detection efficiency, we lower Vbias manually. When
Vbias,0 of D0 drops from −55.26 V to −54.86 V, the detection efficiency P0 reduces from
22.6% to 12.8%. Similarly, we decrease Vbias,1 of D1 from −54.70 V to −54.40 V, leading
to the detection efficiency P1 reduction from 18.9% to 9.7%. After that, we test Eve’s
controllability of these two detectors.
First, I blind the detectors and then measure the relationship between the energy of
trigger pulse and probability to cause a click. The position of trigger pulse is fixed in the
middle of the gate signal. Figure 3.7 shows the testing result which indicates there is a
transition range between 0% and 100% click probability. Solid curves show the energy
of trigger pulse for original Vbias, while dashed curves for reduced Vbias lowering photon
detection efficiency by about a factor of 2. The blinding power is 0.38 mW and the timing
of trigger pulse is aligned in the middle of the gate by minimizing its energy required to
make a click.
From the measurement result, Eve can randomly select different levels of trigger pulse
energy (shown as dotted lines in Fig. 3.7) to attack the full version of countermeasure. As
we know, only when Bob chooses the same measurement basis as Eve, all the energy of
trigger pulse arrives at the targeted detector and achieves a click. For target D0, if trigger
pulse energy E1 is chosen, D0 always clicks, while at E2, the detector only clicks if higher
Vbias is applied. When E1 and E2 are chosen randomly with the same probability P0/2, the
detection probability for higher Vbias is P0 and the detection probability for lower Vbias is
only P0/2. Therefore, the attack reproduces correct detection probabilities as the protocol
requires. Similarly, for target D1, Eve can choose E3 to trigger click always and choose E4
to get a click only if higher Vbias is applied. This reproduces correct detection probabilities,
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Vbias, 0 = 54.86 V
Vbias, 0 = 55.26 V
Vbias, 1 = 54.30 V
Vbias, 1 = 54.70 V
E1E2E3E4
Figure 3.7: Click probabilities under blinding attack versus energy of trigger pulse.
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Vbias, 0 = 54.86 V
Vbias, 0 = 55.26 V
Vbias, 1 = 54.30 V
Vbias, 1 = 54.70 V
Figure 3.8: Click probabilities under blinding attack versus relative time shift of trigger
pulse.
P1/2 and P1. At the same time, E1 and E3 remain safely below E
no gate
never,0,1 shown in Fig. 3.6,
so clicks are never produced in the absence of the gate and alarm is not triggered. This
allows Eve to hack the countermeasure tracelessly.
Second, I test the correlation between time shift of trigger pulse and click probability
of blinded detector. The trigger pulse energy I use in this test for D1 is slightly lower than
that of D0, but both levels of energy are above Egatealways,0,1 in Fig. 3.6 marked as red ×. The
measurement result is shown in Fig. 3.8. Solid curves give the detection probability at the
original Vbias, and dashed curves give the detection probability at lower Vbias. Note that
the latter extends over a relatively narrower time window. The blinding power is 0.38 mW.
The energy of trigger pulse for D0 is 0.22 pJ and for D1 is 0.19 pJ. These energy levels
are marked as red × in Fig. 3.6.
This testing result illustrates another method to attack the countermeasure: randomly
adjusting the time shift of the trigger pulse. For D0, after fixing the suitable energy level of
the trigger pulse, Eve can always trigger a click by choosing time shift T1, but only trigger
a click at higher Vbias by choosing T2. Similarly, if target detector is D1, the detector always
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clicks at T3, but only clicks at higher Vbias at T4. Then, when Eve sends the trigger pulse
to control D0, she randomly selects T1 and T2 with equal probability P0/2 to reproduce
the correct detection efficiencies of D0. Eve utilizes the same strategy for D1 to achieve
correct detection probabilities, P1/2 and P1. In this way, Eve also hacks Clavis2 system
tracelessly.
Generally, a finite set of decoy detection efficiency levels η1 < η2 < η3 < ... < ηn can be
hacked by properly setting probabilities of different attacking energy levels or time-shifts.
We take energy levels of trigger pulse as an example. According to the result in Fig. 3.7,
it is reasonable to extrapolate that we can find n distinct levels of trigger pulse energy
E1 > E2 > E3 > ... > En in this situation. Then Eve can apply Ek (k = 1, ..., n) with
probability qk to satisfy ηk =
∑k
i=1 qi. This would reproduce every expected value of ηk
and hack the system. We have so far assumed that applying energy level Ek causes zero
click probability for decoy levels up to ηk−1, and 100% click probability for ηk and above.
However this is not a necessary condition. More generally, under energy Ek, the click
probability for efficiency level ηi is β
Ek
ηi
. To reproduce the expected efficiencies, we need to


























ηn + ...+ qnβ
En
ηn = ηn. (3.5)
We might solve these equations to get values 0 ≤ qk < 1. A worse case would be if Eve
cannot find values of all qk, which means she may only have a partial control of Bob’s ηk.
However, it still breaks the assumption in the security proof [103] that Eve cannot form
faked states with click probability conditional on Bob’s randomly chosen efficiency. For
quantitative analysis, an updated security proof would be needed first.
From the above testing and analysis of the implementation that changes Vbias, we can
guess that an alternative implementation that changes Vgate [103] or adds an intensity
modulator in front of the detectors [128], may leave a similar loophole. If we apply the
intensity modulator, the energy of the trigger pulse arriving at the detector is not constant
but depends on the modulation. However, this case is similar to gate voltage modulation,
as we only consider the total energy from the gate signal and trigger pulse. Therefore, we
will get similar results as Figs. 3.7 and 3.8, but the amount of trigger pulse energy and
time shift might be different.
The reason for this practical loophole is a wrong assumption made by Lim and his
colleagues [103]. They assume Eve cannot generate faked states that trigger detections
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with probabilities that are proportional to the original photon detection efficiency. Here
I have proved this is in fact possible. Therefore, the model of a practical detector should
be more precise in security analysis, if one wishes to close the detector control loophole
without resorting to measurement-device-independent QKD.
3.5 Conclusion
I have tested the first implementation of the countermeasure against the blinding attack in
the commercial QKD system Clavis2. Our testing result demonstrates that presently im-
plemented countermeasure is effective against the original blinding attack but not effective
against a modified blinding attack. The modified attack fully controls Bob’s single-photon
detectors but does not trigger the security alarm. The modified attack is similar to the
original detector blinding attack [117] with the only difference that the trigger pulses are
time-aligned to coincide with the detector gates, instead of following it. We argue that this
attack should be implementable in practice against an installed QKD communication line
where Eve does not have physical access to characterizing Alice and Bob. However such
full demonstration has not yet been done, to our knowledge.
I have also tested the full proposed implementation of countermeasure with two non-zero
efficiency levels, and found its security to be unreliable despite predictions of the theory
proposal [103]. From the current testing results, bright-pulse triggering probabilities of the
blinded detectors depend on several factors including Vbias, timing and energy of the trigger
pulse (see Sec. 3.4). This in principle allows Eve to compromise the full countermeasure
implementation.
According to the testing result, this countermeasure is not as reliable as would be
expected in a high-security environment of QKD. Although an ideal industrial counter-
measure has not been achieved, everybody now has a clearer concept about the detector
loopholes. This procedure emphasizes the necessity of security testing every time practical
QKD systems are developed or updated. We only can reach the final practical security
of any QKD system after several iterations of implementation development and testing
verification. Our countermeasure testing also illustrates that patching a loophole is still
time-consuming and difficult. However, addressing practical vulnerabilities at the design
stage of a QKD system is both cheaper and less messy than trying to retrofit patches on






As mentioned before, the security of MDI QKD is based on post-selected entanglement,
and it is able to eliminate all detector side channels from QKD implementations, which are
major security loopholes [61,85,95,117,121,139,146,176,179]. However, a limitation of MDI
QKD is that it requires high-visibility interference between two independent sources, which
makes its implementation more demanding than that of conventional prepare-and-measure
QKD. Moreover, current finite-key security proof [53] requires larger post-processing data
block sizes than those of standard QKD schemes.
To overcome the limitations above, detector-device-independent QKD (DDI QKD),
has been proposed recently [47, 67, 97, 102]. It avoids the challenge of interference from
individual sources by applying the concept of a single-photon Bell state measurement
(BSM) [90]. Consequently, its post-processing data block sizes are similar to these of
prepare-and-measure QKD schemes [101]. It is claimed by the inventors of DDI QKD
protocol that DDI QKD has the same security performance as that of MDI QKD. However,
its security against detector side-channel attacks has not been rigorously proven yet.
In this chapter, the security of DDI QKD is investigated. It shows that, in contrast to
the claimed statement [47, 67, 97, 102], the security of DDI QKD cannot rely on the same
principles as MDI QKD (i.e., post-selected entanglement). Importantly, I demonstrate
that DDI QKD is actually vulnerable to detector side-channel attacks and to other attacks



















Figure 4.1: Possible implementations of detector-device-independent QKD with linear op-
tics. HWP, half-wave plate; and PM, phase modulator. One single click in the detector
D1, D2, D3, or D4 corresponds to a projection into the Bell state |Ψ+〉, |Φ+〉, |Ψ−〉, or |Φ−〉
respectively (see main text for further details).
when all the devices, except for detectors, are fully characterized and trusted, which is an
essential assumption in DDI QKD.
4.1 Principles of DDI QKD
DDI QKD [47,67,97,102] attempts to follow the same idea of MDI QKD. The key difference
is to replace the two-photon BSM with a two-qubit single-photon BSM [90]. This means
that Alice and Bob use two different degrees of freedom of the same single photons to encode
their secret information. In this scheme, there is no need for interfering photons from two
independent sources. An example of a possible implementation is shown in Fig. 4.1 [102]
(Ref. 47, 67, 97 propose similar schemes). In Fig. 4.1, Alice sends Bob one of BB84
polarization states: (|H〉+ eiθA |V〉)/
√
2, where |H〉 (|V〉) denotes the horizontal (vertical)
polarization, and the phase θA ∈ {0, π/2, π, 3π/2}. Once Bob receives the photons from
the quantum channel, he encodes his bit information in the spatial degree of freedom. This
is completed by a 50 : 50 beamsplitter (BS) to randomly choose either upper path, denoted
as state |u〉, or lower path, denoted as state |l〉. A phase modulator (PM) at lower path
randomly applies a phase ϕB ∈ {0, π/2, π, 3π/2} to each incoming signal (see Fig. 4.1).




2 and |Ψ±〉 = (|H〉 |l〉±|V〉 |u〉)/
√
2. A detection event in each detector
Di corresponds to a projection on a specific Bell state.
Similarly to MDI QKD, DDI QKD requires that Alice’s and Bob’s state preparation
devices are characterized and trusted. This requirement is indicated by the grey areas
shown in Fig. 4.1. In DDI QKD, BS, PM, and half-wave plate (HWP) inside Bob’s grey
area are a linear optical network. The rest of trusted elements in Bob belong to the BSM.
Most importantly, the detectors Di do not need to be characterized, but only need to be
trusted that no information leaks to the outside.
4.2 The security of DDI QKD is not based on post-
selected entanglement
At first glance, it seems that the security of DDI QKD follows that of MDI QKD, but only
changes two-photon BSM to the two-qubit single-photon BSM. Both MDI QKD and DDI
QKD assumes that Alice’s and Bob’s state preparation processes are trusted [47, 67, 97,
102, 110]. If it is true, that means the security of DDI QKD also relies on post-selected
entanglement between Alice and Bob after BSM. Ref. 138 first indicates a confrontation
of this DDI QKD idea. In that article, it was shown that DDI QKD is, in fact, insecure if
Eve replaces Bob’s detectors with measurement devices that leak detection results to the
public channel [138]. Even though this result posed the possible insecurity of DDI QKD, it
violates one of the important assumptions in DDI QKD. That is, Bob’s detectors have to
be built by a trusted party to avoid information leakage to the outside [67], but they are
not fully characterized. This section shows that even following the security assumptions,
the security of DDI QKD cannot be based on post-selected entanglement, in contrast to
MDI QKD.
The security analysis is based on the DDI QKD scheme shown in Fig. 4.1. A mod-
ification is made for a clear explanation. Particularly, it is assumed that Bob’s receiver
contains only one detector, for example, the detector D1, but the other three detectors are
disconnected. It means that now Bob’s BSM can only project the encoded photons into
the Bell state |Ψ+〉. Logically, if the security of DDI QKD is based on post-selected entan-
glement, this slight modification should not compromise its security, but reduces the secret
key rate to one fourth. The projection into a single Bell state in MDI QKD is sufficient
to guarantee security [110]. However, the following analysis shows that a detector blinding
attack [61,117] breaks the security of DDI QKD in this scenario.
First, it is supposed that Eve sends continuous-wave (c.w.) bright light to Bob’s detector
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D1, forcing it to be in the linear mode [61, 117]. In this mode, the detector operates as a
classical detector. It means that is not sensitive to single-photon pulses anymore, but is
only able to detect strong pulses. It is reasonable to assume that when blinded D1 receives
a bright pulse with mean photon number µ it always gets a click, while if the mean photon
number reduces to µ/2, it never obtains a click. This performance has been confirmed in
experiments for different detector types [61,73,83,115,117,118,150,177].
Eve then performs an intercept-resend attack based on the blinded D1. She first mea-
sures every signal sent by Alice in one of the two BB84 bases that are randomly selected.
According to the measured result, she prepares a new signal and send it to Bob. Assume
that the faked states that Eve sends to Bob are coherent states,
∣∣√2µ
〉
, with creation oper-
ator a† = (a†H +e
iφEa†V)/
√
2. Here, a†H (a
†
V) is the creation operator for horizontal (vertical)
polarization, and the phase φE ∈ {0, π/2, π, 3π/2} is the same as Eve’s measurement result.








































The specific results under different cases are listed in Table 4.1, where it shows the mean
photon number reaching each of Bob’s detectors for all combinations of φE and ϕB. From
this table, please note that if D1 is the only one detector, Bob only can obtain detections
when he chooses the same measurement basis as Eve’s. For example, when ϕB, φE ∈ {0, π}
or ϕB, φE ∈ {π/2, 3π/2}), and ϕB = φE, D1 always receive µ photons, which triggers a
click, but does not introduce any error. This attack indicates that the DDI QKD scheme
illustrated in Fig. 4.1 with only one detector D1 is indeed insecure against the detector
blinding attack, which is just as the same as the standard QKD schemes. This shows that
the DDI QKD scheme cannot defeat the detector side-channel attack. That is, the security
of DDI QKD cannot be based on post-selected entanglement. The same conclusion can be
applied to other DDI QKD implementations in Refs. 47,67,97.
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Table 4.1: Mean photon number of the input light to Bob’s detectors as a function of the
phases φE and ϕB.
(a) φE = 0
ϕB D1 D2 D3 D4
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(c) φE = π
ϕB D1 D2 D3 D4
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4.3 Insecurity of DDI QKD against side-channel at-
tacks
4.3.1 Side-channel attacks against Bob’s detectors
Following the analysis in the previous section, let’s consider a full DDI QKD scheme
with four detectors as shown in Fig. 4.1. In the four-detector scheme, there is one main
drawback for the detector blinding attack: it triggers double-clicks [138]. From Table 4.1,
it is obvious that whenever Bob selects the same measurement basis as Eve, it always
makes two detectors click. For instance, when ϕB = φE = 0, the detectors D1 and D2
always click. Similar results happen for the other cases. These double clicks allow Alice
and Bob to notice the presence of Eve. So, the security question becomes that whether or
not four active detectors can guarantee the claimed performance of DDI QKD again. As
shown below, the answer is “no”. In this section, two possible hacking strategies exploiting
imperfections of Bob’s detectors are presented to avoid double-clicks.
The first strategy that allows Eve to avoid double-clicks is based on a time-shift at-
tack [121, 139], which exploits the detection efficiency mismatch between Bob’s detectors.
In this type of attack, Eve shifts the arrival time of each signal that she sends to Bob
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Figure 4.2: Measured detection efficiency mismatch in bright-light blinded regime in com-
mercial QKD system Clavis2 at PB = 0.32 mW, ET = 0.24 pJ, and 0.7 ns wide trigger
pulse (see main text for further details).
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ηdet = 1D2 
ηdet = 0
ηdet = 1D1
Figure 4.3: Detector click trigger thresholds versus blinding power PB for two different
single-photon detectors D1 and D2 under the blinding attack in commercial QKD system
Clavis2.
such that only one detector can produce a click each given time. Here, we have confirmed
experimentally that this type of attack is also possible with blinded detectors. For this,
we blinded two single-photon detectors from the commercial QKD system Clavis2 [29]
and we measured their detection efficiency mismatch. The experimental results are shown
in Fig. 4.2. These results are applicable to the DDI QKD scheme in Fig. 4.1. Let us con-
sider again the case where ϕB = φE = 0. Suppose that Eve would like to force a click only
on detector D1, and no click on detector D2. Then, to achieve this goal, she can simply
shift the arriving time of signals to T1. We find that only the detector D1 can produce a
click because this instance is outside of the response region of the detector D2. Similarly,
sending the signals at T2 only triggers the detector D2. That is, by combining the time-shift
attack with the blinding attack introduced in the previous section, Eve could again break
the security of DDI QKD without introducing errors nor double-clicks.
Another eavesdropping strategy is using the fact that single-photon detectors respond
differently to the same blinding power PB. The testing results have been presented in Chap-
ter 3. Reprinted Fig. 4.3 from Ref. [73] shows again the response of two single-photon
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detectors in a commercial QKD system Clavis2 [29] to varying blinding power PB. The
maximum and minimum value of the trigger pulse energy ET for which the click probabil-
ities are 0 and 1 respectively during the gate time. By choosing different blinding power
and trigger pulse energy, one is able to avoid double-clicks as well. For example, as shown
in Fig. 4.3, the values PB ≈ 0.2 mW and ET ≈ 0.1 pJ can only trigger the detector D1.
Similarly, PB ≈ 0.56 mW and ET ≈ 0.19 pJ can only make the detector D2 register a click.
The attacks described above show that if Bob’s detectors are uncharacterized, as as-
sumed in DDI QKD, this type of schemes are indeed insecure against detector side-channel
attacks. That is, Eve could learn the whole secret key without producing any error nor a
double-click.
4.3.2 Side-channel attacks against Bob’s linear optics network
One main assumption of DDI QKD is that Bob’s linear optics network (i.e., the grey area
within Bob’s receiver in Fig. 4.1) is fully characterized and trusted. Note that, however,
this does not mean that its devices need to be perfect, as this would be impossible to
achieve in practice. In this section, we show that Eve could also exploit various typical
imperfections of Bob’s linear optics to avoid double clicks when performing the blinding
attack described in ??.
For example, we consider the situation where Eve exploits the fact that Bob’s BSes are
not perfect to avoid double-clicks. Although a 50 : 50 BS designed to operate at a certain
wavelength (say, for example, at 1550 nm) can achieve nearly perfect splitting ratio at that
wavelength, its splitting ratio can vary significantly at a different wavelength. For instance,
a custom-made beamsplitter sample studied in Ref. [96] exhibited an extreme behaviour
with splitting ratio of 98.6 : 1.4 (0.3 : 99.7) at 1470 nm (1290 nm). While commercial
beamsplitter models may exhibit less variation, Eve in general can to some extent control
the splitting ratio by simply changing the wavelength of the signals [96], and this could be
used to avoid double-clicks.
In particular, suppose that Eve’s signals are in a wavelength such that the splitting ratio
of Bob’s first (second) BS is t1 : 1− t1 (t2 : 1− t2). In addition, suppose that the creation
operator of Eve’s coherent states
∣∣√2µ
〉






where the parameter γ is chosen by Eve. In this scenario, it can be shown that the state
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Figure 4.4: Normalised energy at the input ports of Bob’s detectors Di as a function of φE,
when ϕB = π/2.








































where x̂ = 1− x, and α = √2µ. Note that when t1 = t2 = γ = 1/2 we obtain Eq. 4.1.
This means that, in principle, Eve might select the parameter γ and the wavelength
of her signals such that the resulting splitting ratios t1 and t2 make the input energies at
Bob’s detectors asymmetric. In so doing, and following a similar argumentation to the one
introduced in the previous eavesdropping strategy, Eve can guarantee that when she and
52
Bob choose the same basis, only one detector clicks. This situation is illustrated in Fig. 4.4
for a particular example where ϕB = π/2, t1 = 0.44, t2 = 0.46, and γ = 0.2. In this
scenario, we assume that the splitting ratio of Bob’s first (second) BS is 44 : 56 (46 : 54),
and Eve’s state parameter γ = 0.2. We find that the maximum normalized energy at the
input ports of Bob’s detectors D1 and D4 when Eve selects φE = π/2 is, respectively, 0.96
and 0.87. Similarly, when she chooses φE = 3π/2 the maximum normalized energy at the
detectors D3 and D2 is, respectively, 0.9 and 0.84. Therefore, Eve can choose the energy of
her signals such that only the detector D1 (D3) clicks when φE = π/2 (φE = 3π/2). That
is, by changing the values of the parameters t1, t2, and γ, Eve can guarantee that only one
detector clicks each given time.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, the security of the DDI QKD has been analyzed. In the beginning, DDI
QKD promised to be secure against detector side-channel attacks. However, it has been
shown that its security cannot be based on post-selected entanglement, which was claimed.
Most importantly, we have presented several types of attacks to show that DDI QKD is
actually vulnerable to detector side-channel attacks and other side-channel attacks exploit-
ing imperfections of Bob’s linear optical network. These attacks are effective even under
the assumptions of the DDI QKD. That is, Alice’s and Bob’s state preparation devices are
fully characterized and trusted, and Bob’s detectors are only trusted but not characterized.
From this study, it is clear that the security of DDI QKD scheme is actually the same as
that of a standard prepare-and-measure scheme. It means that DDI QKD scheme does
not provide any security advantage. Most importantly, the DDI QKD cannot be treated
as a simple version of the MDI QKD. The MDI QKD still seems to be the only practical
solution to defeat all the detector side channels.
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Chapter 5
Decoy state QKD with imperfect
source
The security of the measurement station is not required for the MDI QKD. However, even
in MDI QKD, the source still needs to be protected. Unfortunately, in practice, the require-
ments for the source may not be satisfied. It is hence important to investigate the practical
imperfections in the source station. This chapter is based on a reprint (arXiv:1711.00597).
5.1 Motivation
In practical quantum cryptographic systems, a weak coherent source (WCS) is widely used
to replace the single photon source. One inherent imperfection in WCS is the emission of
multi-photon pulses, which gives Eve more than one copy of Alice’s quantum states. Eve
could then perform the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [43,75], in which she blocks
all single-photon pulses, and keeps one photon from the multi-photon state. She could
then get all the final key after Alice and Bob announce their basis choices. Note that a
modified PNS attack based on a beam splitter has been demonstrated [105]. Thus, the
danger of PNS attack is not only theoretical but also practical. Fortunately, decoy state
protocols [76,112,175] were proposed to beat such attack, which has been implemented in
many QKD systems [106, 144, 152, 166, 182]. It has also been employed in other quantum
cryptographic systems [42,59,183,185] to guarantee their security.
Generally speaking, in the decoy state protocol, signal and decoy states only have
different mean photon numbers. Decoy states are used to estimate the detection gain and
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error rate of single-photon pulses in signal states. If Eve could not distinguish the signal
and decoy states, then she would change the photon number in both signal and decoy
pulses during the PNS attack [43,75]. Thus, she would disturb the yield and error rate of
decoy states, which affects the estimation of single-photon detection gain and error rate in
signal states. It results in the decrease of the secure key rate [112].
However, the essential assumption - the indistinguishability of the signal and decoy
states - may not be guaranteed in practice. In fact, Eve might exploit practical imperfec-
tions to find a side channel which allows her to distinguish the signal and decoy states. She
could then perform different hacking strategies to keep the normal statistic distributions,
while spying on some secret information silently without being discovered. Several types
of source imperfections and corresponding attacks have been shown in different QKD sys-
tems [82, 132, 165, 168]. Importantly, the first quantum satellite also employs one of such
imperfect sources [99]. The security of the decoy state QKD with a leaky source has been
considered by Tamaki and his co-workers [165], in which the imperfection of signal and
decoy states is taken into account. However, a linear program problem should be solved
to estimate the contribution of the single photon pulse in their security proof, which is
complex.
In this chapter, I study several types of implementations for the decoy state protocol
to show some side channels, the corresponding attack, and solutions.
5.2 Decoy state protocol
As a fundamental theory of our research, we recap the decoy state protocol first in this
section. Here we take the weak + vacuum decoy state protocol [120] as an example to
explain the basic idea of the decoy state protocol. This simple one weak + vacuum decoy
state protocol is commonly used in Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) QKD system [35], as
it provides the optimal key rate in the case of only two decoy states [120]. The security
analysis in Secs. 5.4 to 5.6 also follows this decoy state model.
According to the analysis of Gottesman-Lo-Lütkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) [70], the key
rate of QKD with the WCS can be written as
R ≥ q{−QµH2(Eµ)f(Eµ) + P µ1 Y µ1 [1−H2(eµ1)]}. (5.1)
Here q = 1/2 for BB84 protocol (if one uses the efficient BB84 protocol [109], q ≈ 1), the
subscript µ means the intensity of a signal state, Qµ (Eµ) is the total gain (the error rate)
of the signal state, Y µ1 and e
µ




the probability of single-photon pulses, f(x) is the bidirectional error correction efficiency,
normally f(x) ≥ 1 with Shannon limit f(x) = 1, andH2(x) = −x log2(x)−(1−x) log2(1−x)
is the binary Shannon information entropy.
In Eq. (5.1), Qµ and Eµ are directly obtained in an experiment, and P
µ
1 is known for a
given source. Thus, the major task of the decoy state is to tightly estimate the lower bound
of Y µ1 and upper bound of e
µ
1 . Note the fact that, if the phase of the WCS is randomized





P ωn |n〉〈n|, (5.2)
where ω = {µ, ν, 0} represents the average intensity of pulse signal state µ, decoy state ν,
and vacuum state that is always 0. P ωn is the probability distribution of n-photon number
from the source with the intensity ω. For the WCS, P ωn = e
−ωωn/n! . Without loss of
















Here Y ωn (or e
ω
n) is the yield (or the error rate) given that Alice sends a n-photon pulse
from the source with intensity ω. Obviously, if Eve does not have any prior information
about the intensity of Alice’s pulse, we can assume that







The lower bound of Y1 and upper bound of e1 can be then estimated by solving the linear
Eqs. (5.3) with weak + vacuum decoy states [120].
5.3 Intensity modulation test
To evaluate the realization of the weak + vacuum decoy state protocol, we test two intensity
modulation methods. The first method under testing is the pump-current modulation,
similar to Refs. 100, 184. For the signal and weak decoy states, different intensities are
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produced by applying different pulses of pump current to a laser diode. Thus, the laser
diode directly emits optical pulses with different intensities. The vacuum state is generated
by turning off the pump current. An optical attenuator then applies a fixed attenuation
to all the optical pulses, to reach single-photon level. The second method under testing
is an external intensity modulator, similar to Refs. 57, 144, 188. Optical pulses could be
produced with a constant intensity from a laser diode first, and then the different intensities
of signal and decoy states are modulated by an intensity modulator (IM). Similar to the
former method, a fixed attenuator provides attenuation to the single-photon level.
Our intensity measurement of the optical pulses is taken before the fixed attenuation
is applied. The optical pulses are measured by a photodetector (40 GHz bandwidth) and
an oscilloscope (33 GHz bandwidth), averaging & 5000 pulses. We obtain the normal-
ized probability distribution of emitting photons over time which is shown in Figs. 5.1(a)
and 5.2. Although we measure the intensity of classical optical pulses, the probability of
emitting single photon should follow the same distribution, because constant attenuation
is applied.
For the case of pump-current modulation, Fig. 5.1(a) clearly shows that the probability
distributions of emitting the signal state and the decoy state do not totally overlap. The
main peaks of these two distributions are mismatched. The signal state emits earlier than
the decoy state with high probability and has a secondary peak from 662 to 937 ps. Over
the same time interval, the probability distribution of the decoy state drops to low values.
The timing mismatch of the signal state and the decoy state clearly violates the basic
assumption of indistinguishability in the decoy state protocol. As we show numerically
in Sec. 5.4, this can be exploited by Eve to bypass the protection of the decoy state
protocol. However, the measured result of external intensity modulation in Fig. 5.2 does
not show a measurable timing mismatch between signal and decoy states. This is expected
because the pulse generation and intensity modulation in this type of source are physically
decoupled and performed by separate devices. As long as there is no electrical crosstalk
between the laser diode driver and intensity modulator driver, no correlation is expected.
This is the case, as Fig. 5.2 shows.
To investigate the reason for timing mismatch in the case of pump-current modulation,
we measure the current flowing through the laser diode (Agilecom WSLS-940010C4123).
A differential probe with 30 GHz bandwidth (Agilent N5445A) is used to measure the
differential voltage V across the laser diode and its built-in serial resistor Rs = 20 Ω. Since
the laser diode forward voltage Vd = 1.23 V is known from its test sheet, we can calculate
the pump current I = (V − Vd)/Rs. This calculated current is shown in Fig. 5.1(b). The


















































Figure 5.1: Pump-current modulation. (a) Normalized intensity distribution of the signal
state and the decoy state measured in the time domain. For ease of comparison, the pulses
are normalized to have the same area. (b) Laser-diode’s pump current. The relative time




































Figure 5.2: External intensity modulation. Normalized intensity distribution of the signal
state and the decoy state measured in the time domain.
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If the laser diode was pumped by a constant current, any current above the lasing
threshold Ith = 14 mA (shown in the figure) would result in continuous-wave (c.w.) laser
emission. However, when the current is initially zero then rapidly increased above Ith, the
diode does not begin to lase immediately [33]. First, a certain number of carriers should
be injected into the p-n junction before the diode reaches population inversion, and that
takes time (the higher the current, the less time). Once the population inversion is reached
and the diode attains light amplification condition, the few spontaneously emitted photons
present in the optical cavity need time to amplify into the strong coherent light. This results
in a fraction-of-nanosecond delay between the application of current and the start of strong
light emission. In this process, the population inversion and emitted light power briefly
overshoot the steady-state. They then undergo a few oscillations with ∼ 100 ps period and
eventually settle at the steady-state c.w. level if the pump current continues [33]. However,
if the pump current is interrupted, as is the case with our device under test, the lasing
stops. As can be seen in Fig. 5.1, the signal state is produced by a higher peak current
pulse, the laser begins emitting light earlier and has time to emit two light pulses (i.e., light
power oscillations) before the current stops. When the decoy state is produced by a lower
peak current pulse, light emission begins later and the laser only has time to emit one light
pulse. Although this physics of laser diode operation is well-known to the manufacturers of
pulsed laser diodes (e.g., PicoQuant), it is a somewhat obscure topic for many electronics
engineers. The engineers who have selected this modulation method for the QKD system
under test may not have been aware of its implications on the timing and shape of emitted
pulses.
5.4 PNS attack
In the case of pump-current modulation, being that the signal state and the decoy state
are partially distinguishable in the time domain, the PNS attack becomes possible again.
Here we consider a special PNS attack summarized in Table 5.1. Eve selects time windows
Ws and Wd to observe states sent by Alice. By properly setting the intervals of Ws and
Wd, Eve treats all the states observed in Ws (Wd) as the signal state (the decoy state). She
then performs the PNS attack. For single-photon states, Eve blocks or forwards those that
are in the observation windows, while she blocks all of those that are out of the observation
windows. Once the states contain two or more photons, Eve keeps one photon and either
blocks or forwards the rest of the photons to Bob in the observation windows but forwards
all the photons to Bob when the states are out of the windows. If Eve obtains photons in
both Ws and Wd, she randomly keeps photons in only one window and forwards the rest
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Table 5.1: Hacking strategy and corresponding yields.
PNS attack In the time windows
Outside the
time windows
Single-photon states Forward or block Block
Multiphoton states
Keep one photon and
forward or block others
Forward
Yield Y ωEven Z
ω
n
0 (n = 1)
Y ωn (n ≥ 2)
of photons to Bob.
By following the criteria of a successful attack proposed in Ref. 168, the success of
the above attack could be analyzed. A successful attack lets Eve know partial information
about the final secret key. In other words, Alice and Bob’s key remains partially insecure
after post-processing. To show this, a lower bound of the key rate under Alice and Bob’s
estimation, Rl, and an upper bound of the key rate under Eve’s attack, Ru, are compared.
If
Rl > Ru, (5.5)
the shared final key must be partially insecure, and then Eve knows some amount of
information. This is the result that Eve’s attack would like to achieve.
The lower bound of the key rate is the one used in the decoy state protocol [120]:
Rl = −QµH2(Eµ)f(Eµ) + Y µ1 µe−µ[1−H2(eµ1)], (5.6)
which is consistent with Eq. (5.1) when we consider the efficient BB84 protocol [109], q = 1.
Here Y µ1 and e
µ
1 are the single-photon yield and the error rate in the normal decoy state
protocol. It is the secure key rate from Alice and Bob’s point of view under the attack.
Since Alice and Bob do not know about Eve’s attack, the estimation of the lower bound of
Y µ1 and the upper bound of e
µ
1 still follows the weak + vacuum decoy protocol [120] with
the assumption of indistinguishability. The actual upper bound of the key rate under the
PNS attack [168] is
Ru = Y µEve1 µe
−µ, (5.7)
where Y µEve1 is the real overall yield of single-photon states under Eve’s attack. Apparently,
the goal of our attack is to minimize the upper bound in Eq. (6.2) to satisfy inequality (5.5),
while matching the value of Qω and even reaching lower QBER than QωEω. The attack
will then remain unnoticed.
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Based on the measurement result in Fig. 5.1(a), Eve can only partially distinguish the
signal state and the decoy state. Hence, within a certain observation window, we define the
following guessing probability. The conditional probability P (i
∣∣j) is defined as Eve guesses
the state is i given Alice actually sending the j state. Here i, j ∈ [s, d], which means i
or j is either the signal state, s, or the decoy state, d. Thus, P (s
∣∣s) and P (d
∣∣d) are the
probabilities of correct guess in Ws and Wd respectively, while P (s
∣∣d) and P (d
∣∣s) are the
probabilities of wrong guess in the same windows.
As mentioned in the hacking strategy, once Eve observes multiphoton states in Ws
or Wd, she keeps a single photon and might forward or block the remaining photons to
Bob. To maintain the statistics of Qω and QωEω, Eve has to manipulate detection yield
in the observation windows from Y ωn to Z
ω
n as shown in Table 5.1. In the time window




n). Please note that Eve allows to use a lower-loss,
or even lossless, channel, which means Zωn could be greater than Y
ω
n . At the phase of
decoy announcement in QKD protocol, Bob classifies detection slots according to Alice’s
signal and decoy information. Thus, under Eve’s attack, the yields Y ωEven actually should
be recalculated as follows. For the single-photon states, Eve fully controls the yields, since
the single-photon states out of time windows are blocked. Thus, Y ωEve1 are given by
Y µEve1 = P (s
∣∣s)Zµ1 + P (d
∣∣s)Zν1 ,
Y νEve1 = P (s
∣∣d)Zµ1 + P (d
∣∣d)Zν1 .
(5.8)
For multiphoton states (n ≥ 2), Eve forwards the states to Bob when these states are out
of observation windows, so Y ωEven are given by
Y µEven
=P (s
∣∣s)Zµn + P (d





∣∣d)Zµn + P (d



























































Here we consider an extreme case. A dark count introduces error half the time. There is
no error if signal and decoy states are correctly distinguished by Eve or states are out of
the windows Ws and Wd. However, a wrong guess in Ws and Wd results in random clicks,
which introduces error half the time.
According to the standard decoy state protocol [120], the normal overall gains should
be
Qω = Y0 + 1− e−ηω, (5.12)




where ηBob is the transmittance of Bob’s optical device, including detector efficiency, and
α is the transmittance of channel between Alice and Bob. Typically, α = 0.21 dB/km for





Y0 + edetector(1− e−ηω), (5.14)
where edetector is the probability that a photon goes to erroneous detector, characterizing
the alignment and stability of a QKD system.
To achieve a successful attack, the upper bound of the key rate Ru should be minimized,
which is equivalent to minimizing Y µEve1 in Eq. (5.8). Meanwhile, to achieve a traceless





∣∣s), P (s|d) and P (d|d) for every distance value. Therefore, it becomes an optimization
problem under certain constraints:
min
Zµn ,Zνn;P (s|s),P (d|s)
Y µEve1 (5.15)
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Figure 5.3: The lower bound Rl and optimized upper bound Ru of the key rate under our
simulated attack.
subject to
Qµ = QµEve ,
Qν = QνEve ,
EµQµ > EµEveQµEve ,
EνQν > EνEveQνEve ,
Zµn , Z
ν
n ∈ [0, 1],
P (s|s), P (d|s), P (s|d), P (d|d) ∈ [0, 1].
(5.16)
Ideally, the detection efficiency could be 100%, so the yield Zωn could reach 1. We also
remark that the probabilities P (i
∣∣j) are taken from the measured probability distribution
of the states sent by Alice in Fig. 5.1(a). P (s
∣∣s) and P (s
∣∣d) should be taken from the
time window Ws; P (d
∣∣s) and P (d
∣∣d) should be taken from the time window Wd. Impor-
tantly, since every time window could contain several timing intervals, any observation
probabilities mentioned above should be the summary of all the possibilities in the time
windows.
The simulation result is shown in Fig. 5.3. To follow the initial analysis of weak + vac-
uum decoy state protocol in Ref. 120, we also use the detection parameters from Gobby-
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Yuan-Shields (GYS) experiment [66] in our attack simulation. The dark count rate Y0 =
1.7× 10−6, the transmission in Bob’s apparatus ηBob = 4.5%, the misalignment error rate
edetector = 3.3% and the error correction efficiency f(Eµ) = 1.22. However, we assume
the source has characteristics as in Fig. 5.1(a); this source actually comes from a different
QKD system with the mean photon number µ = 0.6 for the signal state and ν = 0.2 for the
weak decoy state. According to inequality (5.5), once the optimized upper bound starts
becoming smaller than the lower bound, Eve can successfully execute the PNS attack.
Figure 5.3 shows that Eve is able to hack it successfully and eavesdrop some of the secret
keys when the distance between Alice and Bob is longer than 47 km. The attack windows
Ws and Wd are optimized for every distance point to get the lowest R
u at this distance.
For example, when the distance between Alice and Bob is 49 km, the optimized Ws and
Wd are shown as grey zones in Fig. 5.1(a).
5.5 Tightened the secure key rate with an imperfect
source
The previous section shows the effect of partial distinguishability between signal and decoy
states in the time domain. However, the side channel that partially distinguishes signal
and decoy states could be more general. For example, generating signal and decoy states
by individual laser diodes is widely employed in QKD systems [106, 135, 187], even in the
first quantum satellite [99]. Unfortunately, this type of state preparation might leak the
modulation information in the time and frequency (spectral) domains, which was shown
in the previous research [132]. For another preparation method of one laser diode with
an IM in a plug-and-play system, Eve shifts the arriving time of pulses to the rising edge
of intensity modulation, obtaining a side channel in the frequency domain in the plug-
and-play system [82]. Moreover, the modulation information of IM might be read out by
an active Trojan-horse attack [165, 172]. Even if the intensity modulation is perfect, the
laser pulses with non-random phases give Eve a chance to distinguish signal and decoy
states [168]. Therefore, it is important to build a general security model that tolerates
such side channels. In this section, we modify the model of the decoy state protocol to
consider such imperfect sources and derive two tight analytic formulas that estimate the
contribution of single-photon pulses.
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5.5.1 Model
The following analysis is based on the weak + vacuum decoy state protocol with intensities
ω = {µ, ν, ν1}. Without loss of generality, it is assumed µ > ν > ν1 and µ > ν + ν1. When
the imperfection of source is considered in the security model, the density matrix of Alice’s
states [Eq. (5.2)] becomes





P ωn fω(λ)|n, λ〉〈n, λ|. (5.17)
Here ρω(λ) is Eve’s quantum state applied to tell the signal state and the decoy state
for each pulse. We remark that ρω(λ) can be an extra quantum state, or any additional
dimension of Alice’s pulses. λ denotes the dimension, like the time, frequency etc., used by
Eve, which is measured to distinguish between the signal state and the decoy state. fω(λ)
is the normalized probability distribution of λ (
∑
λ fω(λ) = 1), which is also depends on
the intensities of Alice’s pulse ω. Apparently, when ρω(λ) is not correlated to the intensities
of Alice’s pulse, which means ρµ(λ) = ρν(λ) = ρν1(λ) ≡ ρ(λ). Thus, the general decoy
state method in Eq. (5.2) is able to estimate the bound of the yield and the error rate for
the single photon pulses [120].
By integrating Eq. (5.17) into Eqs. (5.3), the total gain and the error rate of Alice’s




























where Yn(λ) and en(λ) are the yield and the error rate when Alice sends a n-photon pulse
and meanwhile Eve obtains λ from her measurement. Hence, Yn(λ) and en(λ) rely on the
parameter λ, but are not dependent on ω.











where tr|x| is defined as the trace distance of quantum state.
Here, we choose the case of slight timing difference between the signal state (µ) and the
decoy state (ν) to show the imperfection of source Dωω′ . Without loss of generality, it is
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Figure 5.4: The imperfection of the signal state and the decoy state, Dµν , for different
widths of pulses.
assumed that the shape of the signal pulse and the decoy pulse follow Gaussian distribution.
After attenuated to be single-photon level, the probability distributions of the signal state
















Here t0 is the centering shift between the signal state and the decoy state; σ is the standard
deviation of Gaussian distribution. It is assumed the signal and decoy states have the same
standard deviation. If the 3 dB pulse width is ∆t, it is easy to know that σ = ∆t/
√
8 ln 2.

























dx is the error correction function. The result in Fig. 5.4 clearly
illustrates that even a small timing difference t0 will leak secret information to Eve. In
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a practical QKD system, it may be challenging for Alice to fully match the central time
of the signal state and decoy state (i.e., t0 = 0). However, Fig. 5.4 shows that Alice is
able to reduce Dµν by broadening her pulse. For instance, in the case that t0 = 10 ps,
Dµν = 0.0931 when ∆t = 100 ps, but it decreases to Dµν = 0.0094 when ∆t = 1 ns.
Furthermore, it is remarkable that even though Fig. 5.4 illustrates the mismatch between
the signal state and the decoy state in time, the method of characterization is effective for
any other dimensions, for example, frequency, spatial mode in free space, and so on.
5.5.2 Lower bound of Y µ1
Now we calculate the lower bound of Y µ1 from the model given above. According to Eq. (5.19),
it is easy to obtain inequalities
|Y ωn − Y ω
′
n | ≤ 2Dωω′ ,




n | ≤ 2Dωω′ ,
(5.22)
where ω, ω′ = µ, ν, ν1 and 1 > µ > ν > ν1 > 0. The lower bound of Y
µ
1 can be then





since the vacuum pulse are the same and cannot provide any information to Eve. Hence,
the lower bound of the background rate Y0 can be estimated as follows.







n − ν1νnY νn )







n − νn−1Y νn )







n + 2Dµν1)− νn−1(Y µn − 2Dµν)]












(νn−11 − νn−1)Y µn ]






≤ (ν − ν1)Y0 + 2Dµν1ν(eν1 − 1) + 2Dµνν1(eν − 1)
≡ (ν − ν1)Y0 + g′(µ, ν, ν1).
(5.23)
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Note that νn−1− νn−11 ≥ 0 is applied above. From inequality (5.23), the lower bound of Y0
can be then obtained
Y0 ≥ Y L0 = max{
1
ν − ν1
[νeν1Qν1 − ν1eνQν − g′(µ, ν, ν1)], 0}. (5.24)
We can estimate the lower bound of Y1 as shown below.
















(νnY νn − νn1 Y ν1n )





[νn(Y µn + 2Dµν)− νn1 (Y µn − 2Dµν1)]





[(νn − νn1 )Y µn + 2νnDµν + 2νn1Dµν1 ]





(νn − νn1 )Y µn + 2Dµν(eν − 1) + 2Dµν1(eν1 − 1)
≤ (ν − ν1)Y µ1 +
ν2 − ν21
µ2
(eµQµ − Y L0 − µY µ1 ) +









(eµQµ − Y L0 ) +









is used for all n ≥ 2, and Y L0 is given by Eq. (5.24).
In Eq. (5.25),
g(µ, ν, ν1) ≡
2µ[Dµν(e
ν − 1) +Dµν1(eν1 − 1)]
µ(ν − ν1)− (ν2 − ν21)
. (5.26)







µ(ν − ν1)− (ν2 − ν21)
− g(µ, ν, ν1)
≡ G(µ, ν, ν1)− g(µ, ν, ν1).
(5.27)
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G(µ, ν, ν1), the same as Eq. (21) in Ref. 120, represents the yield of the single photon
pulse with a perfect source. Thus, g(µ, ν, ν1) means the leaky information because of the
imperfection of source.
In general, weak + vacuum state protocol is applied in experiments, which means
ν1 = 0. Hence, the lower bound of Y0 can be obtained from Eq. (5.24): Y
L
0 = Qν1=0 = Qvac.











5.5.3 Upper bound of eµ1








n ≥ e0Y0 + ωY ω1 eω1 , (5.29)
we can have
eµ1 ≤









νQνEν − e0Y L0 + 2νDµν
νY µ1






























= uY µ1 e
µ





n − νY νn eνn
n!













= (µ− ν)Y µ1 eµ1 − 2Dµν(eν − 1).
(5.31)
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0, due to no difference for the
vacuum pulse. We then obtain
eµ1 ≤
eµQµEµ − eνQνEν + 2Dµν(eν − 1)
(µ− ν)Y µ1
≡ Kµν . (5.32)
Similarly, we have
eµ1 ≤
eµQµEµ − eν1Qν1Eν1 + 2Dµν1(eν1 − 1)
(µ− ν1)Y µ1
≡ Kµν1 . (5.33)
Thus, we can estimate the upper bound of eµ1 by
eµ1 ≤ min{Kµ, Kν , Kν1 , Kµν , Kµν1}. (5.34)






which is hold by the definition of e1. Also, K
µν1 = Kµ. Thus, the upper bound of eµ1 can
be rewritten as
eµ1 ≤ min{Kµ, Kν , Kµν}. (5.36)
5.5.4 Numerical simulation
We simulate the weak + vacuum decoy state protocol with an imperfect source as shown
in Fig. 5.5. If there is no Eve, the total gain and the error rate of the signal state and the
decoy state are given by Eqs. (5.12) and (5.14). The rest of parameters follow the definition
in standard decoy state protocol [120]. Submitting Eqs. (5.12) and (5.14) into Eqs. (5.28)
and (5.36), the lower bound of yield and the upper bound of the error rate for the single
photon pulse are shown in Fig. 5.5(a) and (b). The estimated key rate is then illustrated
in Fig. 5.5(c). The detection parameters used in the simulations are the same as those
in Fig. 5.3. The intensities of the signal state and the decoy state are optimized with step
0.01 from µ ∈ [0.01, 0.5], ν ∈ [0.01, 0.2]. We only show the estimated Y µ1 and eµ1 where the
final key rate is positive. No secure key can be generated for Dµν = 10
−1 and 10−2. The
results clearly show that the imperfection of source decreases the key rate between Alice
and Bob rapidly. For example, when the source is perfect, the maximum distance can
reach about 141 km. However, the maximum distances have decreased to 124, 92, 48 km
for Dµν = 10
−5, 10−4, 10−3. No positive key rate at any distance for Dµν = 10
−2, 10−1.
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Figure 5.5: Estimated system parameters with imperfect source. (a) the yield and (b) the
error rate of the signal state for the single photon pulse, and (c) the key rate are shown
for different amounts of imperfection Dµν .
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Figure 5.6: The estimated key rate assuming calibrated transmittance in Bob’s optical
devices. The detection parameters used here are the same as those in Fig. 5.3.
5.5.5 Theory improvement
From the modified security proof in the last section, it is shown that even for the relatively
small imperfection Dµν = 10
−3, the maximum secure distance under the tightened key
rate drops quickly from 141 km to 48 km. Here, we propose an advanced security proof to
improve the final key rate with the imperfect source by setting a reasonable assumption.
We could then loosen the security constraint when estimating Y µ1 and e
µ
1 , theoretically
improving the secure key rate and the maximum secure distance.
In practical QKD systems based on a prepare-and-measurement protocol, Bob’s devices
are located within his protected zone. Thus, it is possible for Bob to calibrate the optical
transmittance of his optical devices. Note that here we do not mean that Eve could not
change the parameters of Bob’s system (for example, change the SPD from Geiger mode to
linear mode by performing the blinding attack), but mean that Bob could actively calibrate
the transmittance of his partial devices or all devices. In fact, this assumption has been
used to secure the single photon detector of Bob [124,125]. Thus, we think this assumption
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is reasonable and practical. We can then have
Yn(λ) ≤ 1− (1− ηcalBob)n. (5.37)
Please note that ηcalBob is the calibrated transmittance in Bob, which should be equal to or
lower than the total transmittance of Bob ηBob. In the simulation, we could easily assume
that Bob can calibrate the whole transmittance in his apparatus. We could then have
ηcalBob = ηBob. Thus, Eq. (5.22) becomes
|Y ωn − Y ω
′
n | ≤ 2Dωω′ [1− (1− ηBob)n],




n | ≤ 2Dωω′ [1− (1− ηBob)n].
(5.38)
In the weak + vacuum decoy state protocol, the lower bound of Y µ1 [Eq. (5.28)] and the
upper bound of eµ1 [Eq. (5.36)] can be obtained
Y µ1 ≥
µ








− 2Dµν(eν − eν(1−ηBob))],














We can then estimate the final key rate following the same method provided above. The
estimation result in Fig. 5.6 shows that when the transmittance of Bob’s optical devices
(ηBob = 4.5%) is calibrated, the final key rate and the maximum distance are improved.
For instance, if Dµν = 10
−3, the maximum distance increases from 48 km to 105 km. We
may also note that for Dµν = 10
−2 and 10−1, the improved proof can generate the positive
key rate up to 64 km and 18 km. We would remark here that the assumption of calibrated
transmission loss for Bob’s devices is not applicable to measurement-device-independent
QKD (MDI QKD), in which the detection part is not in the protected zone and can be
fully controlled by Eve.
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5.6 Discussion and application examples
The security proof in Sec. 5.5 considers a type of imperfect source that could partially dis-
tinguish signal and decoy states in any degrees of freedom. Once these imperfections are
experimentally measured, the security proof proposed in this work may provide a standard
method to calculate the final key rate under such imperfections. Our security proof focuses
on the imperfect modulation of signal and decoy states, but does not handle the distin-
guishability among different BB84 states. We currently assume the identical mismatch of
signal and decoy states for each BB84 state. Removing this theoretical limitation could be
future work.
Another limitation lies in our experiment. We have measured the distinguishability
between signal and decoy states only in the time domain. However, the two modula-
tion methods that we have tested might also introduce time-dependent spectral mismatch,
which we have not measured. For the gain-switched semiconductor laser, a short pulse usu-
ally has a so-called chirp, a fast-changing wavelength modulation [91, 104]. The spectral
and intensity modulation contribute simultaneously to the distinguishability, resulting in
a joint distribution of Dµν as explained later in this section. The external intensity modu-
lator may also affect the spectrum of pulses [88, 93]. However, the requisite time-resolved
spectroscopy is a more complex measurement [104, 133, 151], which could be investigated
in the future. For the two devices tested, we henceforth assume distinguishability in the
time domain only.
We now apply our security proof to the measurement results of the two sources tested
in Sec. 5.3, and to one more published source measurement in Ref. 132. Both the initial
method in Sec. 5.5.4 and the improved method in Sec. 5.5.5 are applied in each case. The
purpose of this application is quantifying the imperfection of signal state and decoy state
preparation, and showing its effect on the secure key rate. To compare the three source
implementations, we arbitrarily assume that these different types of the sources are used
in the same fiber-based QKD system with GYS parameters at the detection side. The
resulting secure key rates are shown in Fig. 5.7. The key rate is estimated by the initial
proof with Eq. (5.28) and Eq. (5.36) and the improved proof with Eq. (5.39). Note that
in the case of Dµν = 0.1400, no secure key can be generated with the initial proof, but a
positive key rate is possible with our improved proof. Dµν = 0.4005 cannot generate the
positive key rate in either proof.
For the first case shown in Fig. 5.1(a), the corresponding value ofDµν given by Eq. (5.19)
is 0.4005. Both our security proofs are then applied. For the improved proof, we assume
ηBob = 4.5%. The secure key rate is zero under either key rate estimation. This verifies
again that the modulation imperfection makes the system insecure.
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Figure 5.7: The estimated key rate for different experimental distinguishability of signal
and decoy states. The detection parameters used here are the same as in Fig. 5.3.
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On the contrary, the value of Dµν for the case in Fig. 5.2 is only 3.6× 10−3. This non-
zero value probably stems from the noise in our characterization apparatus. Nevertheless,
we should conservatively treat all mismatch as belonging to the source under test. This
non-zero value of Dµν still indicates the certain degree of mismatch. As shown in Fig. 5.7,
under the initial proof, the maximum distance drops to 22 km, while under the advanced
proof with ηBob = 4.5%, the key rate is improved to 83 km. That is, owing to a much lower
mismatch in this case, the positive key rate could be generated.
Another case of imperfect preparation for signal and decoy states is published in Ref.
132. In that study, the signal and decoy states are generated by individual laser diodes,
which is a common technique [99, 106, 135, 187]. It shows that mismatches between signal
and decoy states are both in the time domain and frequency domain for each individual
BB84 state [132]. Being that our proof cannot handle the BB84 states individually, we
have chosen a typical mismatch between the signal and decoy states in vertical polarization
as reprinted in Fig. 5.8, and assumed arbitrarily that the other three BB84 polarization
states have the mismatch identical to that. Even though Ref. 132 studies an imperfect
source in a free-space QKD system, we remark that it is reasonable to expect mismatch
for any QKD implementations that generate signal and decoy states by individual laser
diodes [99, 106,135,187].
The security proof in Sec. 5.5 is able to handle mismatch in arbitrary degrees of freedom,
being that we do not specify the dimensions of the probability fω(λ). fω(λ) can be a joint
probability. For example, the joint probability distribution of ω state in the time and
frequency domains can be fω(t, f), where t represents the time domain and f represents








|fµ(t, f)− fν(t, f)|. (5.40)
Similarly, the calculation of Dµν can be expanded to more than two dimensions. In the
specific case showed in Fig. 5.8, time-resolved spectroscopy necessary to measure the joint
probability was not performed. It has been arbitrarily assumed instead that the probability
distributions in the time and frequency domains are independent, with a remark that this
will need to be verified experimentally [132]. Then, fω(t, f) = fω(t)fω(f) can be calculated
from the available experimental data. The corresponding Dµν is 0.1400. With such value
of Dµν , the initial security proof cannot generate the positive key rate for this case, while
the improved proof with ηBob = 4.5% could generate the secure key up to only 10 km, as
shown in Fig. 5.7.
According to the above analysis and comparison of the three cases, the external intensity
modulator shows the smallest mismatch between signal and decoy states, resulting in the
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Figure 5.8: Mismatch of signal and decoy states for the vertical-polarization pair of laser
diodes in (a) time domain and (b) frequency domain. Data reprinted from Ref. 132.
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highest key rate and longest transmission distance. This indicates that modulating signal
and decoy states by the intensity modulator could be a proper method to realize the decoy
state protocol. However, Trojan-horse attack could read out the modulation information
from the intensity modulator [165,172]. Thus, countermeasures against Trojan-horse attack
are also necessary [113, 148]. The intensity modulator may also result in the non-zero
vacuum state, which can be handled by our security proof. The secure key rate can then
be estimated by applying Eqs. (5.27) and (5.34).
All the measurement results shown above contain a measurement error. The error may
come from the thermal noise of electronic devices, the nonlinearity of optical-to-electrical
converters and digital-to-analog converters in the oscilloscope. We have simply treated the
measured Dµν as the real mismatch. Thus, the key rates showed in Fig. 5.7 are conservative
estimates. It is an open question of how to extract the real parameter from the noisy test
results.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated the imperfect sources in QKD systems that implement
the decoy state protocol. By testing two intensity modulation methods, we have found that
the basic assumption about the indistinguishability of signal and decoy states does not hold
in practice, especially in the case of laser diode pump current modulation. This pump-
current modulation shows timing mismatch between the signal and decoy states. We have
modeled a PNS attack based on the timing mismatch that breaks the security of the QKD
system. To make the system robust against this loophole, we have modified the method of
generating the secure key rate in the decoy state protocol to consider an imperfect source,
in which a signal state and a decoy state are distinguishable in any degrees of freedom. Our
proof proves that the distinguishability would reduce the secure key rate. We have applied
our proof to three implementations of the decoy state protocol to estimate the secure key
rate that, in some cases, has become reduced (also limiting the transmission distance) and
in some cases, is just zero.
The evaluation of the three types of intensity modulation indicates that implementing
the decoy state by an external intensity modulator is superior to the other methods. It
leaves less distinguishability between signal and decoy states, consequently maintaining the
higher key rate. We do not recommend the other two methods: pump-current modulation
and individual-laser-diode generation, because they show a significant mismatch. Time-
resolved spectroscopy should be performed in the future to check whether it enlarges the
imperfection Dµν .
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Our security proof with an imperfect source provides a general method to guarantee the
security of practical quantum cryptographic systems. It may be employed as a standard
tool to estimate the secure key rate, once the source imperfection in the decoy state protocol
is quantified in all degrees of freedom. A conceptually similar evaluation method has been
proposed for the Trojan-horse attack [113].
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Chapter 6
Laser seeding attack on the source
6.1 Motivation
The security of the source is vital to any QKD system. Unfortunately, this important re-
quirement is not always satisfied in practice. For example, the widely-used weak coherent
source sometimes generates multiple photons, which enables the PNS attack (see Sec. 2.3.1).
This problem can be practically solved by the decoy-state protocol (see Sec. 5.2). Never-
theless, other side channels created by Eve might also compromise the security of QKD
systems.
In this work, we study Eve’s capability to manipulate a laser diode in the apparatus
of state preparation. We show that Eve can increase the output power of the laser diode,
which increases the mean photon number of the optical pulses. In this attack, Eve injects
photons into a laser diode to trigger a stronger stimulated emission than usual, which
results in an increased intensity. We test two types of laser diodes and analyze the effect
on the security of the standard QKD protocol.
6.2 Experimental scheme and principle
To investigate Eve’s ability to control a semiconductor laser diode, we conduct our testing
according to the scheme shown in Fig. 6.1. At Alice’s side, the laser diode generates optical
pulses as a testing target. An eavesdropper Eve employs a tunable laser (Agilent 8164B)













Figure 6.1: Experimental scheme of laser seeding test. The red path represents Eve’s
injection, and the blue path shows the direction of photon emission from Alice’s laser. LD:
laser diode; CIR: circulator; PC: polarization controller; OSC: oscilloscope.
the adjustment of its wavelength and the output power. Thus, Eve injects photons with
a particular wavelength into Alice’s laser. With this wavelength, the energy of injected
photons matches the energy difference between the excited state and the ground state of
electrons in Alice’s laser, which satisfies the condition of stimulated emission in the laser
diode.
A polarization controller is applied to adjust Eve’s laser, matching the polarization of
Alice’s laser. This adjustment maximizes the injection efficiency. We employ a circulator
to isolate the injected light From Eve and the emitting light from Alice’s laser. Eve sends
the tampering light from port 1 to port 2, while the output of Alice’s laser goes through
port 2 to port 3. After that, Alice’s output energy is measured by an optical-to-electronic
converter (with 1 GHz bandwidth) that connects to an oscilloscope (Agilent DSOX93303Q)
with 33 GHz bandwidth. Hence, we can observe the energy of Alice’s laser pulse with and
without Eve’s tampering. We test two ID300 short-pulse lasers from ID Quantique and
one Thorlabs-LP1550-SAD2 laser diode as Alice’s laser. All the laser diodes under test
generate optical pulses with a repetition frequency of 1 MHz.
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Figure 6.2: Waveforms of ID300’s laser pulses with and without Eve’s tampering.



























Two samples of the ID300 laser have been tested, and the testing results from these two
lasers show Eve’s ability to control the output power. By following the testing scheme
in Fig. 6.1, we first adjust the wavelength of Eve’s laser to 1556.90 nm and 1557.18 nm for
sample 1 and sample 2, respectively. Once finding the correct wavelength, we gradually
increase the power of the c.w. laser. The energy of the optical pulses emitted from Alice
increases as c.w. power increases. Figure 6.2 shows the waveforms of the pulses under Eve’s
attack. Compared to the original laser pulse, the amplitude of the pulse during the attack
becomes much higher than usual, and increasing injection power results in an increasing
output power. Secondly, the injected light also broadens the width of Alice’s optical pulse.
This is because a stimulated emission triggered by the injected light takes less time than
the spontaneous emission which usually takes place.
We measure the pulse energy under various levels of tampering power as shown in Fig. 6.3.
For each sample of the ID300 laser, the initial energy without light injection is 0.12 pJ for
sample 1 and 0.08 pJ for sample 2. The injected c.w. laser then increases gradually to
9 mW, which triggers the increase of Alice’s pulse energy. Finally, the output energy of
Alice’s laser rises to 0.62 pJ for sample 1 and 0.48 pJ for sample 2. Under 9 mW light
injection, the pulse energy increases 5.2 times for sample 1 and 6.0 times for sample 2.
The increased intensity is verified again for the Thorlabs-LP1550-SAD2 laser, albeit
less spectacularly. The c.w. light with a wavelength of 1551.32 nm is injected into Alice’s
laser and triggers a higher output power than usual. Figure 6.4 shows the waveforms of
four specific cases: no tampering power, 3 mW tampering power, 6 mW tampering power,
and 9 mW tampering power. It is obvious that, under the attack, the amplitude becomes
higher along with the increase of the tampering power. The quantified increase of pulse
energies under different amounts of tampering power is shown in Fig. 6.5. Initially, the
energy of Alice’s laser pulse is 2.217 pJ. The pulse energy then gradually rises under the
attack, and reaches 2.388 pJ with 9 mW tampering power. The energy of the tampered
pulse is 1.077 times higher than the original one.
6.4 Security analysis under the attack
This laser seeding attack exploits the vulnerability of the laser in Alice, so that Eve can
manipulate and increase the output power of Alice’s laser. The increased power results
in a larger mean photon number than the value that Alice and Bob expected, which
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Figure 6.4: Waveforms of laser pulses emitted from Thorlabs-LP1550-SAD2 with and
without Eve’s tampering.
























Figure 6.5: Alice’s output energy versus Eve’s tampering power from Thorlabs-LP1550-
SAD2.
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compromises the security of a QKD system. Here, we take the case of doubled intensities
under the attack as an example to show the security threat to a QKD system. In this
security analysis, we follow the security model of the BB84 QKD protocol with decoy states.
As we have shown in Chapter 5, the key rate of a QKD system with a weak coherent laser
source is given by the Gottesman-Lo-Lütkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) model [70] as follows.
R ≥ q{−QµH2(Eµ)f(Eµ) + P µ1 Y µ1 [1−H2(eµ1)]}, (6.1)
where all the parameters also follow the same definitions described previously in Chapter 5.
In particular, µ represents the average intensity of the signal state; Qµ and Eµ are the total
gain and error rate of the signal state; Y µ1 and e
µ
1 are the yield and the error rate of single-
photon pulses; P µ1 is the probability of single-photon pulses.
In the GLLP model, µ is a preset parameter that is shared between Alice and Bob. Once
µ is decided and fixed, P µ1 is automatically known according to the Poisson distribution
of the weak coherent source. On the other hand, Qµ and Eµ are experimental parameters
that Bob obtains during the raw key exchange. The decoy states then help Alice and Bob
tightly estimate the lower bound of Y µ1 and the upper bound of e
µ
1 [120]. As we have
mentioned previously in Chapter 5, the commonly used decoy protocol applies a weak
decoy state with average intensity ν and a vacuum state with intensity 0 [120]. If the
intensities of the signal and decoy states are the same as the preset µ and ν, the GLLP
model with the decoy state protocol works well. This model can produce the tight lower
bound of the secret key rate.
However, it is evident that the laser seeding attack changes the values of µ and ν, and
therefore the key rate estimated by Alice and Bob also changes. For example, we assume
that the average intensities µ and ν become 2µ and 2ν under the attack, while Alice and
Bob are not aware of the change. They still believe the average intensities are µ and ν.
Hence, the probability of single-photon pulses is still supposed to be P µ1 . In contrast, the
total detection gain Q and error rate E are actual parameters that Bob receives from the
quantum channel, so that Q2µ and E2µ are applied to estimate the key rate by Alice and
Bob.
It is notable that, in principle, Alice and Bob could monitor the detection gain. How-
ever, in practice, they do not. There are several reasons for this. First, monitoring the
detection gain would require characterizing the channel beforehand, which is tricky because
Eve could also tamper with such characterization. Second, the typical security proofs of
QKD do not consider any priori knowledge about the behavior of the quantum channel.
They rely on the knowledge of the quantum states sent by Alice, the knowledge of the
quantum measurements performed by Bob, and the observed experimental data. Addi-
tionally, a practical QKD system just requires a minimum detection rate below which the
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protocol aborts. Therefore, it is reasonable that Alice and Bob estimate the key rate with
preset µ, ν and P µ1 with measured Q2µ and E2µ. Apparently, this estimation is not pre-
cise. In contrast, the correct key rate with doubled intensities should be estimated by the
parameters 2µ, 2ν and P 2µ1 with the measured Q2µ and E2µ.
I simulate both the wrong and correct key rates as shown in Fig. 6.6. In the simulation,
we assume the efficient BB84 protocol [109] with q = 1. For the source, we assume that
the preset intensities are µ = 0.6 and ν = 0.2. For the detection, we use the detection
parameters from Gobby-Yuan-Shields (GYS) experiment [66]: the dark count rate Y0 =
1.7× 10−6, the transmission in Bob’s apparatus ηBob = 4.5%, the misalignment error rate
edetector = 3.3% and the error correction efficiency f(Eµ) = 1.22. For comparison, I first plot
the key rate with intensities µ = 0.6 and ν = 0.2, which shows the key rate during normal
operation without the attack as the red dashed curve shown in Fig. 6.6. The blue curve
in Fig. 6.6 illustrates the key rate that Alice and Bob estimate during the attack. Since
the detection gain under doubled intensities is larger than usual, Alice and Bob generate a
higher key rate than that in the normal case. It hints the incorrect estimation. Moreover,
the correct key rate under doubled intensities is showed as the green curve in Fig. 6.6,
which is much lower than the key rate that Alice and Bob estimate. It shows that with the
current security analysis, Alice and Bob would distill a key that is insecure to a significant
degree. That is, they overestimate the key rate.
It is remarkable to consider that lower bounds might improve. One might develop a
better security analysis that provides higher rates for a certain distance. One day, the
correct lower bound might reach the blue curve. Therefore, we cannot completely discard
the reality that an improved future security analysis could make the blue line secure.
However, the secure key rate is limited by the upper bound, which indicates that the
highest key rate can be achieved by any current and future security analysis. That is, it
guarantees that the key rates beyond the upper bound are certainly insecure. Hence, to
determine the key-rate limitation in our case, I also calculate the upper bound of the key
rate in the BB84 protocol with doubled intensities by
Ru = Y 2µ1 2µe
−2µ. (6.2)
The simulation result is drawn as the pink curve in Fig. 6.6. The upper bound is lower than
the overestimated lower bound up to a distance of about 140 km. It shows that the key rate
overestimated by Alice and Bob is definitely insecure, at least when the communication
distance is shorter than 140 km.
Further security analysis is in progress as my collaborators are currently analyzing the
threat of increased intensities for an MDI QKD system.
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Figure 6.6: Key rates under the laser seeding attack with doubled intensities. LB: lower
bound, UB: upper bound.
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6.5 Conclusion
In this study, I show experimentally that Eve can tamper with the emitted power of a laser
source by injecting light into the laser diode. This results in the increased intensities of
signals transmitted to Bob. The security analysis based on the decoy BB84 QKD protocol
illustrates that the increased intensities of the signal pulses can compromise the security
of the QKD system.
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Chapter 7
Laser damage attack on optical
attenuators in QKD
7.1 Motivation
In practice, QKD systems widely employ weak coherent lasers as sources, with mean photon
numbers attenuated to single-photon levels. This ensures that the most quantum states
are sent using single-photon pulses, so an eavesdropper cannot split and measure the states
independently. Additionally, the side effect of the minor multi-photon states is removed by
applying decoy state protocol [112,120,175]. However, if an optical attenuation component
can be altered and its attenuation decreased, either permanently or temporarily, it is
possible again for an eavesdropper to obtain parts of the secret key. Please note that the
optical attenuator is usually the last component in Alice’s apparatus right before the states
are sent to the quantum channel. For Eve, an attenuator is the first component her laser
reaches when she injects laser power to Alice. In our experiment, we attempt to reduce the
attenuation in three types of optical attenuators through optical damage. This experiment
assesses the possibility of such an attack, which, if successful, would break the fundamental
assumption in state preparation in QKD systems.
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7.2 Optical power handling capacity of single-mode
fibers
In our experiment, a high-power laser is the tool for Eve’s attack. At the first step, how
much optical power is allowed to be transmitted through a single-mode fiber needs to
be clarified. Here, we set the restriction that Eve can only use a standard single-mode
fiber, instead of a multi-mode fiber, in her attack, because this is the case for the quantum
channel in the real scenario of QKD. The amount of optical power is limited by the inherent
handling capability of the single-mode fiber and the safety requirement of the laser source.
The laser-induced damage threshold (LIDT) of the standard single-mode silica fiber
has been discussed in Ref. 113. The theoretical LIDT relies on the softening point of
silica [178], which is 5.5 × 104 W over 50 µm2 fiber core area [113]. However, in reality,
thermal damage likely happens at the fiber connection points or the interface between the
fiber core and the cladding. The fiber fuse is triggered by high temperature at a fiber end
facet. This fiber fuse can be realized by taking the fiber end against an absorptive material
such as metal to accumulate heat, or also by using a flame (∼ 2700 ◦C) to provide a high
temperature. It has been experimentally demonstrated that 2–5 W continuous-wave (c.w.)
laser can initiate a fiber fuse [87]. For our experiment, we tested a 20 m single-mode fiber
ending without any termination. When no deliberate method is applied attempting to
trigger a fiber fuse, the fiber can tolerate 9 W c.w. laser. Thus in practice, the fiber fuse
threshold can deviate from the precise LIDT. A reasonable value of LIDT given in Ref. 113
is 12.8 W for c.w. laser.
The source of the high-power laser also needs to be protected from damage. The
major threat comes from backward scatterings in the optical fiber, especially the back-
ward stimulated Raman scattering (SRS) and the backward stimulated Brillouin scatter-
ing (SBS) [157]. Generally, during the light transmission, a fraction of incident light can
be transferred from one optical field to another field with a frequency shift, due to the
vibration of the transmission medium. The frequency-shifted light is called Stokes wave.
The Stokes wave may rapidly increase over the transmission, which causes SRS and the
SBS. The SRS and SBS can travel backward to the laser source such that the source may
be destroyed. To keep the high-power laser source being safe, the thresholds of SRS and
SBS are investigated for our case. The threshold is defined as the incident pump power
Pth, at which point the backward Stokes power Ps becomes equal to the input power at
the fiber output [157]
Pth exp(−αL) = Ps(L), (7.1)
where α is the fiber loss (typically 0.2 dB/km at 1550 nm), and L is the transmission
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Figure 7.1: Simulated backward SRS and SBS thresholds.
distance. It indicates that the threshold is dependent on the fiber length.





Here Aeff is the effective core area. For the standard single-mode fiber with the core
diameter of 8 µm, Aeff = 50 µm
2. gR is the Raman-gain coefficient, which is 6.67 ×
10−14 m/W at 1550 nm wavelength [32]. Leff is the effective interaction length defined as
Leff = [1− exp(−αL)]/α. (7.3)
Thus, the threshold value is dependent on the transmission distance. The simulation result
about P SRSth versus transmission distance is given in Fig. 7.1. The result shows that the SRS
threshold drops dramatically when the fibre length extends. However, the short-distance
transmission until 1 km can handle more than 10 W optical power.
On the other hand, the backward SBS plays a key role in limiting the transmission
power. SBS can occur at a much lower incident power level than that needed for SRS. The
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where the Brillouin-gain coefficient gB = 5 × 10−11 m/W [32]. This threshold allows only
0.2 W as maximum input power. Fortunately, the SBS threshold can increase considerably
if the spectral width ∆νp of pump laser is much larger than the full width at half maxi-
mum (FWHM) of the Brillouin-gain spectrum ∆νB in the SBS. More specifically, the SBS
threshold in Eq. (7.4) increases by a factor of 1 + ∆νp/∆νB. In our situation, we employ
a laser diode with ∆νp = 10 GHz in our experiment. ∆νB in the single-mode fiber at
1550 nm is 16 MHz. The SBS threshold in this case is then shown in Fig. 7.1. It is obvious
that the SBS threshold follows the similar trend as the SRS threshold. Both thresholds
are at the similar power levels at the same distance. For example, at the distance of 1 km,
the SBS threshold is still 13.5 W.
Overall, a 10 W c.w. laser is allowed to safely transmit through 1 km single mode fiber.
The shorter the distance, the larger handling capability of c.w. power. In our experiment,
a laser amplifier provides up to 9 W c.w. power transmitting through a 20-m fiber. Its
feasibility has been theoretically verified by the models above. The details about the
experimental setup are elaborated in the next section.
7.3 Experimental setup
The high-power test of optical attenuators has been conducted using the setup shown
in Fig. 7.2. The experimental scheme simulates a hacking scenario for a running QKD
system. The test laser is a low power single-mode 1550nm fiber-pigtail laser diode (Gooch
& Housego AA1406) acting as Alice’s laser. This laser also provides the initial source
of light for measuring the attenuation. Power meter A (Joinwit JW3208) monitors the
power of the test laser. The input of an optical attenuator under test is connected to the
test laser through a 50:50 beamsplitter (BS). The output of the optical attenuator under
test is connected to a laser amplifier through a 99:1 BS. Power meter B (Thorlabs PM200
with S146C) is used as a monitor for the high power. Power meter C (Thorlabs PM200
with S154C) is applied to check the attenuation of the optical attenuator before and after
optical damage. This scheme represents a real scenario in which Eve injects light to a
source station in a QKD system via a quantum channel from the reversed direction of
Alice’s light.
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The attenuation is determined by comparing the measurement from power meter A and
power meter C, taking into account the additional 20 dB attenuation of the 99 : 1 BS. This
measurement is first performed for each attenuator with the optical amplifier and the seed
laser turned off, so the initial attenuation is calibrated before any attempted tampering.
The same measurement is repeated after laser damage testing. After applying high-power
laser, any attenuation change can then be attributed to optical damage within the setup.
Please note that the beam splitter can tolerate high-power laser during our testing. Thus,
it is reasonable to believe that all the attenuation change is due to the optical attenuator.
In the case where the connection points of fibers are burnt, we treat it as an outcome of
Eve’s attack, which causes denial-of-service in an actual QKD system.
A custom 1550nm Erbium-Ytterbium high-power amplifier (EDFA) is employed in the
experiment. The amplifier is designed using core pumping as the first stage and then
double clad pumping as the second stage. The EDFA allows a high gain and uses an
input seed power as low as 0.4 mW (−4.0 dBm) which is amplified to a maximum of
about 9 W. The EDFA overcomes amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) [56] for high
power double cladding erbium-ytterbium fiber amplifier at 1.0 mm. The presence of this
ASE could lead to spurious lasing at 1.0 µm and limitation of the energy transfer process
from the ytterbium ions to the erbium, which limits the output power level. As a result,
the amplifier produces high output power up to ∼ 9 W (39.5 dBm) through standard
single-mode fiber (SMF-28) with a high slope efficiency of 28%.
In our experiment, a single mode fiber-pigtailed laser (Qphotonics QFBGLD-1550-100)
set to 20 mW continuous output power is used as a seed source for the EDFA. The exact
power applied to the optical attenuator can be calculated from the measurement at power
meter B, as shown in Fig. 7.2 multiplying by a factor of 99. In case that a fiber fuse occurs
while applying high power during the experiment, a protection system is implemented. Two
photodiode monitors are used to detect light from the fiber fuse around the fiber jacket.
The monitors are placed at the output of the EDFA and the input of the attenuator. If
a fiber fuse happens, then the monitor triggers a TTL voltage connected to the EDFA
interlock, thus shutting off the laser and stopping the fiber fuse.
Three types of attenuators are tested. The first type is a variable optical attenuator
(VOA) controlled by microelectromechanical systems (MEMS). The MEMS VOA is elec-
tronically adjustable from a maximum of 31–34 dB at a default control voltage of 0 V to
a minimum of approximately 1 dB at 15 V control voltage. Physical disassembly shows
two closely placed input and output fibers facing an electronically controlled reflector-lens
assembly. The voltage setting controls the tilt of the reflector and changes the amount of























Figure 7.2: Experimental setup. The optical attenuator, as the testing target, is replacable.
The test laser and the high-power laser are applied to the optical attenuator from different
directions.
The second one is a fixed attenuator with about 25dB attenuation. Physical disassembly
shows a dark material between the input and output fibers. The third attenuator is a
variable attenuator adjustable between 1.5 dB to 80 dB. A screw tipped with a dark
material placed between the input and output fibers, which can be inserted between the
input and output. The adjustable position of the screw then changes the amount of light
transmitted from the input to the output.
The testing procedure for each attenuator is as follows. The test laser is always on as
a working QKD system. Eve shines the high-power laser starting from 300 mW and holds
for at least 1 minute. After that, Eve turns off the high-power laser, and the attenuation
is measured. If no attenuation change occurs, then the laser power is gradually increased,
and we repeat the steps above. Until the measurable attenuation change happens, we will
stop the testing. Since there might be a cooling down period in which the attenuation
fluctuates, we record the measurement values during this period. After this period, we also
record the reasonably constant attenuation.
7.4 Experimental results
7.4.1 Testing of individual attenuators
Over these three types of optical attenuators, the MEMS VOA shows a permanent change
of attenuation after being shined upon by the high-power laser. The fixed attenuator shows
a temporary decrease in attenuation, while the screw-tipped VOA appears to be minimally
affected by the high-power laser.
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Figure 7.3: Selected samples of the MEMS VOA with a permanent decrease in attenuation
after laser damage. The horizontal lines indicate the initial measured attenuation before
experimentation.
From 8 tested samples of MEMS VOAs, we were successful in permanently decreasing
the attenuation for three samples with an average decline of 3 dB after our testing as shown
in Fig. 7.3. The permanent decrease in attenuation occurs when a laser power is about 4 W.
If this power level is exceeded, then testing often results in catastrophic damage and has
its attenuation permanently increased to a higher level of about 70 dB. The permanence
of the damage in the MEMS VOA is confirmed by measuring the attenuation after a few
hours and a few days. Moreover, as Fig. 7.4 shows, by measuring the attenuation across
the entire adjustable range, the most permanent decrease in attenuation is 5 dB where
the initial maximum attenuation is 34 dB when no voltage is applied. The difference in
attenuation before and after the damage is gradually reduced for lower attenuations under
higher voltages.
From Fig. 7.4, the noticeable decrease is in the range of the original attenuation from
35 dB to 20 dB, which could be the working range in a QKD system. It is then reasonable
to assume that decreased attenuation can result in higher photon number in the emitted
pulses than Alice expected. This gives Eve the chance to obtain additional photons from
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Sample 1 after damage
Figure 7.4: A sample of the MEMS VOA at various voltage settings, before and after laser
damage.
Alice’s pulses which also carry the secret key.
The fixed attenuator temporarily decreases its attenuation under 5 W hacking laser.
The maximum decrease is about 2 dB, as shown in Fig. 7.5. This decrease in attenuation
with oscillation then goes back to the initial state, which takes several minutes. Eve can
exploit such a time slot to split photons from the output pulses. Thus, part of the secret
information becomes accessible to Eve, but permanent damage also occurs at higher power.
As for the screw-tipped VOA, our testing shows almost no permanent change in the
attenuation even at the highest available laser power of 9 W that is continuously applied
for 20 minutes, although the attenuator reaches 234 ◦ C at this power, as measured by
an infrared camera. However, visual inspection of the optical blocking material at the
adjustable screw tip shows a concave structure which fits the input fiber position where
the laser power is delivered. This suggests that higher optical power is likely to further
damage the screw, while a change in attenuation might be possible.
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Figure 7.5: Samples of the fixed attenuator after being subjected to a damaging laser power
where a temporary decrease in attenuation is observed.
Table 7.1: Results after optical damage for MEMS VOA samples. Testing voltage refers
to the parameter used in step 2 of the experimental procedure. The ∆ column refers to












1 A 12.0 33.05 35.44 +2.39 4.5
2 A 12.0 33.88 32.95 −0.93 5.0
3 A 11.5 32.81 64.28 +31.47 5.6
4 B 14.0 38.79 32.32 −6.47 5.5
5 B 14.5 ≈ 68 58.82 ≈ −9.2 4.0
6 B 13.5 31.21 22.29 −8.92 2.8
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7.4.2 Testing of attenuator assembly

























0 5 10 15
Sample #4
Figure 7.6: Typical VOA voltage-attenuation curves before and after optical damage.
Permanent attenuation drop is observed within the green area.
From the testing above, we confirm that MEMS VOAs are especially vulnerable to
the laser damage attack. The tested samples show a permanent decrease in attenuation
after our testing. To investigate further the possible effects in a real QKD system, we
subsequently test complete PCB-mounted attenuator assemblies for an actual QKD system
provided by the third party. These MEMS VOAs are from two different manufacturers,
labeled type A or B. Each pair of MEMS VOAs is attached using soft silicone glue to the
PCB assembly, providing a thermally accurate representation of the actual QKD system.
We apply the same experimental method as before to test 6 attenuators assembled on
3 PCB boards. At the testing voltage, four out of the six attenuators show a permanent
decrease of attenuation. One of the attenuators (3A) exhibited a catastrophic damage,
where the attenuation after the optical damage is dramatically increased from its normal
value. Another attenuator (1A in Table 7.1) did not show an attenuation drop at the testing
voltage. However, it still has a range where the laser damage can decrease the attenuation
as shown in Fig. 7.6(a). Therefore, for 5 out of 6 attenuators, there exists a range where
the attenuation is decreased after laser damage. Typical results are illustrated in Fig. 7.6
with green areas showing decreased attenuation. Thus, we can reasonably believe that the
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laser damage attack has been successful in these ranges of attenuation for the assembled
samples.
Now we discuss two special samples in details. Attenuator #3 exhibited a near-total
failure, where the attenuation after laser damage is dramatically increased from its normal
value. The high attenuation almost blocks the incoming light, which would result in
denial-of-service in a QKD system. The situation of attenuator #5 is unusual. Before our
high-power testing, we followed the testing procedure to calibrate the attenuation-voltage
curve first. However, the attenuation value becomes latched after 14.5 V which is still in
the working range (0 - 15 V) according to its datasheet. Subsequent voltage adjustments
down to even 0 V did not change this measured attenuation. Since the applied voltage is
close to the maximum voltage, it is likely that the observed latching is due to the inherent
variability between components. Despite this unexpected latching, a permanent decrease
in attenuation still can be observed for this sample.
7.5 Possible MEMS VOA damage mechanisms
During the testing, we have observed temperature rise and physical change of the MEMS
VOA under high optical power. To explain the details, we provide a brief schematic of the
MEMS VOA in Fig. 7.7. Through observation by a thermal camera, we have found that
the front end of the VOA casing with input and output fibers has a higher temperature,
as shown in Fig. 7.8. The high-power laser was set to 2.8 W and turned on from t = 0 s
to t = 250 s in Fig. 7.8. The outer casing of the VOA reached 120◦ C at this damage
threshold power. The cap holding the input and output fibers start to extend outwards
near the threshold of damage, which possibly makes the fibers inside the VOA out of
alignment with the collimation lens. In a catastrophic damage scenario at 6.3 W optical
power, the cap detaches itself from the attenuator casing with smoke emitted. Since the
process of coupling a beam of light into a single-mode fiber is highly dependent on the
relative positions of the involved optical elements [126], we hypothesize that the structural
deformation under high temperatures is one of the possible major causes for the observed
change in attenuation.
7.6 Conclusion
In this work, we test three types of attenuators by c.w. high-power laser. The testing power





Figure 7.7: Simplified schematic of the MEMS variable optical attenuator with labeled
parts (not to scale). (A) Incoming and outgoing single-mode fibers; (B) Glass sheath; (C)
Collimation lens; (D) Voltage adjustable MEMS mirror on torsion mount; (E) Adhesive
filler.
in attenuation. The fixed attenuator temporary declines its attenuation under 5 W laser.
The screw-tipped VOA has minimal change during the testing. The decreased attenuation
results in increased intensity of the transmitted states in a QKD system, which can be
exploited by Eve. It helps Eve to discover the secret information in a QKD system. This
type of attack could break the basic assumption about the mean photon number in a QKD
protocol.
It has been shown that high-power c.w. laser can modify the characteristic of optical
components in QKD systems. To protect a QKD system from laser damage, a watch-
dog monitor might not be enough, because the monitor could also be destroyed by the
high-power laser [122]. We propose to add a special component, an optical fuse [171], at
Alice’s output. The optical fuse would only tolerate a certain amount of laser power but
disconnects itself once the power crosses a threshold. In this way, the optical fuse physi-
cally blocks the injected high power, which effectively protects the system from the laser
damage attack.
This study shows Eve’s capability to change the characteristics of state preparation in
a QKD system. The modification allows Eve to perform side-channel attacks on a source
station, thus breaking the fundamental assumption in security proofs of QKD, even for
those of MDI QKD protocols. The detailed analysis of the effect on BB84 QKD protocols
has been presented in the previous Chapter 6. This would be a trigger to further investigate
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In this chapter, I will summarise other projects that I participated in. Please see reprints
of research papers in the appendices for details.
8.1 Short pulse attack on continuous-variable quan-
tum key distribution system
Homodyne detectors are widely used in a continuous-variable (CV) QKD system for mea-
suring the transmitted photons. However, the imperfection of the homodyne detectors
can be exploited by Eve to break the security of CV QKD systems [141]. In this work,
we further investigate the vulnerability of a homodyne detector. By exploiting the finite
bandwidth of electronic amplifier and limited response time of electronics in the homodyne
detector, we propose and verify a new detector-side-channel attack, short pulse attack, in
CV QKD. This attack is based on the fact that the efficiency of a homodyne detector is
dependent on the input pulse temporal mode [94]. Thus, Bob’s homodyne detector can
respond nonlinearly when Eve manipulates input pulse widths. This behavior breaks the
important linearity assumption in security proof of CV QKD. Hence, we have shown ex-
perimentally the nonlinear response of the homodyne detector. We have also simulated an
intercept-resend attack with the nonlinear response of the homodyne detector to show its
feasibility. The corresponding Qcrypt2017 abstract is included in Appendix A.
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8.2 Effect of atmospheric turbulence on spatial-mode
detector-efficiency mismatch
Previous research has shown that it is possible to hack a free-space QKD receiver by
changing the spatial mode of the incoming beam to the receiver [146]. In this work, we
considered an essential factor, atmospheric turbulence in the channel, into the attack, and
then studied Eve’s ability to perform spatial-mode detector-efficiency mismatch attack.
The atmospheric turbulence is emulated in the lab by using a phase-only spatial light
modulator. After that, we conducted the attack through the turbulence channel. The
experimental results have shown that the stronger turbulence resulted in the weaker mis-
match ratio between different detectors. Therefore, Eve introduced higher QBER under
stronger turbulence during this attack. This result indicates that atmospheric turbulence
disturbs Eve’s attack, giving her a weaker ability for hacking. The study has thus shown
that Eve can attack a free-space non-decoy state BB84 system only up to 250 m away from






The work presented in this thesis was primarily motivated by the need to further investigate
the practical security of quantum cryptography after the proposal of MDI QC. My Ph.D.
research focuses on two main questions: 1) Since MDI QKD has some practical limitations,
are there alternative methods to eliminate the insecurity of detection? 2) For a source that
is assumed to be safe, can Eve exploit new loopholes to break its security even in MDI
QKD? To address these two questions, I have studied the alternative countermeasures
against imperfect detection and the loopholes in the source.
Alternative countermeasures against imperfect detection. Although MDI QKD
removes all detector side-channel attacks, its deployment and application remain limited
due to its incompatibility with current QKD systems and relatively low key rate. As
a commercial alternative, ID Quantique proposed and implemented a random-detection-
efficiency countermeasure as a patch in its existing Clavis2 system. Our experimental
results showed that the countermeasure is not robust against the detector blinding attack.
As another alternative, DDI QKD was proposed to relieve the implementation complexity
of MDI QKD. However, we proved that DDI QKD is not as secure as is claimed. It is, in
fact, insecure against detector side-channel attacks. Based on the imperfection of a beam
splitter, we showed that DDI QKD is also insecure against side-channel attacks on Bob’s
linear optics network.
Loopholes in the source. As an essential assumption in MDI QKD, the source is
required to be trusted. This assumption, however, cannot always be satisfied in practice.
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We investigated the implementations of a decoy-state protocol widely used in a QKD
system with a weak coherent source. The experimental results revealed that the intensity
modulation, especially the pump-current modulation, causes a timing mismatch between
signal and decoy states. A PNS attack was modeled to compromise the security of a QKD
system. To act as an active Eve, we also experimentally demonstrated a laser seeding
attack on the source. The results showed that Eve could increase the emission power of a
laser diode. Furthermore, to create a stronger Eve, we demonstrated a laser damage attack
on various attenuators. The experimental results showed that Eve can decrease the value
of attenuation. The laser seeding attack and the laser damage attack both break the basic
assumption about the mean photon number in QKD.
This work underscores the importance of further scrutinizing the practical security of
quantum cryptography even in the age of MDI QC. Although the MDI concept overcomes
all detector side channels, there is a clear need for additional practical security analysis. For
example, other countermeasures against detector side channels for existing QKD systems
must be verified. Moreover, new attack-resistant protocols must be thoroughly proved
before security claims can be made. For MDI QKD itself, the practical security of the
source should be deeply verified. This research revealed new vulnerabilities and loopholes
in the source, which may become the new “Achilles’ heel” in QKD.
In summary, this doctoral research focused on investigating the practical security of
quantum cryptography, particularly as it relates to MDI QC. MDI QC represents significant
progress in the practical security of QC and will continue to be the primary driver for
practical analyses in the field going forward. This provided the primary motivation for
the thesis work, where quantum hacking offered a promising avenue for evaluating and
verifying the practical security of QKD systems. The more quantum hacking conducted,
the more knowledge about the performance of practical QC gained. In this way, various
devices were tested, and several new vulnerabilities were revealed. Thus, I believe that this
thesis research will contribute to enhancing the security of quantum cryptography.
9.2 Outlook
Although the subject of this thesis is QC security, and in particular uncovering vulner-
abilities to that security through quantum hacking, it is important to relieve a growing
pessimism about the efficacy of QC to defend against future attacks in the quantum-
computing era. Throughout this research, the practical security issues of QC were dis-
cussed with various stakeholders from industry, academia, and the general public. The
fact that a technology proven to be unconditionally secure in theory can still be hacked
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in practice understandably raises doubts around the meaningfulness and usefulness of QC.
However, attempts to hack the QC system and expose vulnerabilities are not attempts to
deny the significance and necessity of QC. QC takes unique advantage of quantum mechan-
ics to ensure its information-theoretic security. Quantum hacking does not challenge the
fundamental superiority of QC theory. Instead, quantum hacking focuses on imperfections
in practical implementations of QC, which are general issues for all types of cryptographic
systems. The purpose of researching quantum hacking is to provide more public informa-
tion about the practical performance of QC systems, which is the first step to improve
their practical security in the future.
On the other hand, while QC is indeed promising, it is not a “silver bulle” solution,
nor is it universal. It cannot replace all other cryptography, nor should it. Currently, very
widely used cryptographic systems still have advantages: they are compact, economical,
mature, etc. Furthermore, although certain public-key cryptographic algorithms will be
vulnerable to quantum computers, it has not been shown that a quantum computer can
break all conventional cryptographic systems. Whether to use conventional or quantum
cryptography can be decided on a case-by-case basis, and should depend on specific security
requirements. For scenarios where super security is required, QC, of course, will be a
good choice. For other scenarios where a certain amount of security risk is acceptable,
conventional cryptography may provide a more convenient solution. Future cryptographic
infrastructure designed to counter threats from quantum computers will benefit from both
post-quantum cryptography and quantum cryptography.
Regarding QC, QKD is the most mature one and has already been commercialized.
As QKD matures, standardization becomes a priority. The purpose of standardization is
to ensure that QKD systems are appropriate for their intended use. Most importantly,
standards increase the security level of QKD products. This can be done by testing the
products and certifying their security performance. ETSI is working on proposing univer-
sally accepted QKD standards and certification [2]. These efforts promote the international
standardization of QKD. Regarding certification, a QKD system should be tested against
different types of attacks. The response of the tested object will show its security strength.
To support this security certification, the more knowledge we gain about practical attacks,
the better security verification we can provide. During my Ph.D., I participated in indus-
try consulting for three QKD companies. These activities provide valuable experience and
information to file the standard for QKD certification.
It is necessary to conduct practical security analysis for QC systems beyond QKD.
Since they use similar optical components as QKD systems, there is a high chance that
the potential threat from imperfect devices will occur in the wider area of QC as well.
Therefore, rigorous investigation of practical security must be a high priority once the
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implementations are available. This research provides a strong reference point for future
security analysis of other QC implementations. However, considering practical imperfec-
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As a coherent detection technique, homodyne detector
(HD) is used in continuous-variable (CV) quantum key
distribution (QKD) system for measurements, which is
one of the main advantages over discrete-variable (DV)
QKD using single photon detectors (SPDs) [1–3]. By
using HD, CV QKD can be fully implemented with off-
the-shelf telecom components [4–6]. The using of Local
Oscillator (LO) in HD acts as single-mode filters, which
enables CV QKD signals to be wavelength-multiplexed
with intense classical channels over optical networks [7].
Moreover, unlike SPDs as vulnerable targets open for
side channel attacks in DV QKD [8–10], CV QKD used
to be believed robust against detector-based attack at
early time. However, recently Ref [11, 12] has shown
that an eavesdropper, Eve, can fully break the security
of CV QKD taking advantage of saturation on HD’s am-
plifier electronics. Although the concept of measurement
device independent (MDI) is already introduced into CV
QKD [13], there is still a large gap between practical
implementation and theoretical proposal, there are even
debates on whether MDI CV QKD can become practi-
cal regarding to its theoretical performances and current
available technologies [14, 15]. Thus, it is worth study-
ing detector based attacks in CV QKD to motivate the
development of practical MDI CV QKD.
Here, we propose a new side channel attack on CV
QKD implementing GG02 (Grosshans and Grangier,
2002) protocol [16] by exploiting HD’s imperfections,
such as the finite bandwidth of HD amplifiers and lim-
FIG. 1: Short pulse demonstration on classical PD with 3.5
GHz bandwidth and HD with 100 MHz. Each square corre-
sponds to a measurement on the maximum amplitude value
of PD (green), PD1 (blue) and PD2 (red) outputs.
ited response time of HD electronics. In particular, we
take advantage of the fact that HD’s efficiency is depen-
dent on the input pulse temporal mode [17] where Bob’s
HD can behave nonlinearly when Eve manipulates in-
put pulse widths. In GG02 protocol, Alice modulates
quadratures X and P of coherent states with a centered
bivariate Gaussian modulation and sends them to Bob.
Bob performs homodyne measurement on these coher-
ent states and decodes them into continuous values as
raw keys. In practice, in order to make sure Bob can
correctly decode information and measure the shot noise
(N0), there is a trade off between electrical noise and
bandwidth of HD. For this reason, most of CV QKD
experiments [4–6] consist HD with only few MHz band-
width to limit electrical noise, since Bob’s HD must be
shot noise limited. Meanwhile Alice needs to increase
the pulse duration (typically 100 ns) and reduce repeti-
tion rate (1 MHz) to meet Bob’s HD bandwidth require-
ment [5]. However, HD bandwidth will reduce the HD
output efficiency significantly if it is smaller than the in-
verse temporal width of the signal temporal mode [17].
Such effects can be obvious when HD bandwidth is rela-
tively small, which gives more space to a potential Eve to
manipulate HD efficiency. The response time of the elec-
tronics is typically not faster than a few ns which means
if the input pulse width is less than few ns, the HD effi-
ciency also becomes very poor. In order to illustrate such
effects, we perform simple experiments in which we vary
width of optical pulses from 1 ns to 100 ns at 1550nm
and send them to a classical optical photodiode (PD) de-
tector with 3.5 GHz bandwidth and one of the port (PD1
or PD2) of our HD with 100 MHz bandwidth. For each
measurement, we record the maximum amplitude value
of PD output during the pulse duration as our measure-
ment results (which is similar to sampling stage of CV
QKD [5, 18]). As shown in Fig.1 when the pulse dura-
tion is longer than 4 ns there is no obvious degrading
effect on the output, however when pulse duration be-
comes shorter, PD’s outputs decrease in both case with
100 MHz at about 3 ns and 3.5 GHz bandwidth at about
1 ns. In order to compare the two cases, we normalize
all the values by the amplitudes measurement with pulse
width of 8 ns. Such observations confirm the predictions
on the relation between HD efficiency and pulse width.
By using such effects, Eve can thus manipulate Bob’s
HD efficiency by changing input pulse widths. If Bob’s
HD efficiency for certain parts of signal pulses becomes
lower, then the linearity between all input quadratures
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FIG. 2: Alice and Bob data distribution under the short pulse
attack. Alice variance 10N0, Alice and Bob distance 40 km,
fiber attenuation coefficient 0.2 dB/km, reconciliation effi-
ciency 94%, Bob’s HD efficiency 60%, electrical noise 0.01N0.
Alice-Bob excess noise estimation based on green data 2.1N0,
on red data 0.0084N0.
and Bob’s HD outputs will not hold, which breaks the
important linearity assumption in security proof of CV
QKD. Assuming Alice and Bob implement GG02 CV
QKD as in [5], we propose Eve’s attack strategy as fol-
lowing: (1) Eve fully characterize Bob’s HD, particularly,
Eve builds the relationship between input pulse width
and HD’s output efficiency as a reference. As illustrated
in Fig. 1, such relationship is determined by the HD’s
amplifier bandwidth and its electronics. (2) Eve cuts the
quantum channel and measures the quadratures X and
P sent by Alice with the help of a heterodyne detection
[19, 20]. (3) According to her measurement results, Eve
prepares corresponding signal pulses as in the intercept-
resend (IR) attack [19, 20] with pulse width of 100 ns.
Such“entanglement breaking” action will normally rise
Alice and Bob’s excess noise estimation to at least two
units of shot noise (2N0), which includes the vacuum
noise of heterodyne detection and the vacuum noise in
the new coherent states preparation. (4) Eve adjusts sig-
nal pulse widths according to following rules: 4.a) Eve
sets a manipulating level (α > 0) on her measurements.
4.b) For any Eve’s measurement larger than α, she re-
duces the pulse width of corresponding re-prepared signal
such that HD output efficiency reduces to a certain level,
which relates to a efficiency reduction ratio R. The rela-
tion between HD efficiency and pulse width is determined
in step (1). 4.c) For all the rest of resent signal pulses,
Eve maintains their widths as Alice’s pulse width (100
ns). 4.d) Eve sends all of these re-prepared signal pulses
to Bob. (5) Bob performs HD measurements on Eve’s
resent pulses; Due to different pulse widths adjusted by
Eve, Bob’s HD output efficiency is not identical respect
to different pulses widths (red dots in Fig. 2). (6) Alice
and Bob then estimate excess noise on corrupted data
which under certain conditions can lead them to under-
estimate the excess noise due to IR attack. Under such
strategy, if the excess noise estimation can be biased be-
low the null key threshold (collective attack [21]), then
Eve’s IR action won’t be spotted by Alice and Bob, which
fully breaks the security. We have confirmed this secu-
rity break in our simulation as shown in Fig. 2, where
red data corresponds to the mentioned strategy, Alice
and Bob estimate excess noise as 0.0084N0 which is still
under null key threshold (0.091N0 with simulation pa-
rameters shown in Fig. 2). Overall, in our strategy Eve
first performs a modified IR attack. By manipulating
certain parts of resent signal pulse widths, Eve can force
Bob’s HD response to be non-linear, which violates the
basic assumption of linear detection. Furthermore, Eve
can set two target levels α1 > 0 and α2 < 0 to have more
freedoms to influence Alice and Bob’s data to achieve
more powerful attack.
Regarding countermeasures, such attack can be pre-
vented by MDI CV QKD [13, 22, 23]. However previous
countermeasures against saturation attack may not be ef-
fective [11, 24, 25]. Since in this short pulse attack, Eve
actually exploits nonlinear response of Bob’s HD in the
linear region that is characterized by Alice and Bob, the
countermeasures of saturation attack only detect any ac-
tions that are happened beyond detection limits, which
will not be enough to detect Eve’s action in this new
attack. On the other hand, the progress of CV QKD se-
curity proof includes additional steps such as symmetric
test on Alice and Bob data [26], which may eventually
cover such kind of attack. Above all, we propose a prac-
tical side channel attack targeting HD finite bandwidth
and limited speed of electronics. We further propose our
attack strategy and demonstrate in simulations that our
attack can break the security of current GG02 CV QKD
implementations.
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Introduction. In theory, quantum key distribution
(QKD) is unconditionally secure; however in practice, a
real system is never perfect. Therefore, it is important
to study the flaws and vulnerabilities of a system, and
find a solution or countermeasure to successful attacks.
Recent studies have shown that it is possible to hack a
QKD receiver by changing the spatial mode of the incom-
ing beam to the receiver [1]. This attack depends on the
ability of the eavesdropper, Eve, to precisely maintain
a certain input angle to the receiver. It is well known
that turbulence in the transmission channel can, in prac-
tice, hinder the performance of both legitimate parties’
communication and the adversary’s attack. While the
assumption of a physical limitation of an eavesdropper
(Eve) is not usually part of the security analysis of a
QKD system, it is common in practice to have a secure
surrounding where Eve could not present, such as in mil-
itary operation. Therefore, the effect of turbulence on
free-space QKD needs to be studied.
We experimentally emulated atmospheric turbulence
in the lab using a phase-only spatial light modulator
(SLM) to test whether such an attack would still suc-
ceed in a turbulent channel. We first verified the accu-
racy and reproducibility of the atmospheric turbulence
emulated by our SLM setup. Then we performed a spa-
tial mode attack for various strengths of the turbulence
following a similar procedure as presented in Sajeed et
al. [1]. From the result, we determined an upper bound
on the level of turbulence and distance from adversary
where such a spatial mode attack can still succeed on
this specific receiver, assuming the adversary only has
practical devices with today’s technology. Therefore we
can determine what atmospheric conditions makes our
system safe from this type of attack.
Turbulence emulator. We use a phase-only SLM
to emulate atmospheric turbulence in the lab. The ad-
vantage of using an SLM as opposed to performing the
experiment outside is the ability to generate reproducible
turbulence of various strengths without being affected by
an unpredictable environment. We chose to generate the
phase holograms that represent turbulence based on the
Kolmogorov model [2] using a superposition of Zernike











































FIG. 1. Turbulence emulator characterization for r0 = 1 cm
and D = 20 cm. A) Simulated centroid displacements corre-
sponding to 500 phase holograms (α = standard deviation).
The size of the data point corresponds to the count frequency.
B) Measured and C) Simulated far-field intensity distribu-
tions. D) Comparison between measured and simulated cen-
troid displacements for hologram subset.
basis choice as they directly relate to known optical aber-
rations, such as tip/tilt, defocus, astigmatism, etc.
Another important advantage to using Zernike modes
as the basis-set is that their weightings can be analyti-
cally calculated based on the strength of turbulence [4].
The radial phase function, φ(ρ, θ), that describes each
phase hologram is given by a weighted sum of several
Zernike polynomials as φ(ρ, θ) =
∑
i ciZi, where Zi and
ci are the Zernike polynomial and corresponding coeffi-
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FIG. 2. Experimental setup of our spatial mode attack in
a turbulent channel. HWP: half wave-plate, QWP: quarter
wave-plate, PBS: polarization beam splitter, A: attenuator,
SLM: spatial light modulator, L1: scanning lens, φ= scanning
angle.
cient for the ith mode, respectively, following the Noll
labelling convention [3].
We can use simple equations and devices, such as a
CCD camera or wavefront sensor, to independently ver-
ify and characterize our turbulence emulator. This step
is crucial before we can proceed with scanning a QKD re-
ceiver in a turbulent channel. It is vital to know whether
the emulated turbulence generated by the SLM setup
agrees with the predicted strength from theory and sim-
ulation results. Therefore, we calculated the theoretical
far-field intensity distribution and centroid displacement
for comparison with experimental results.
Figure 1 shows both the theoretical and experimen-
tal far-field intensity distributions and centroid displace-
ments that emulates strong atmosphere turbulence cor-
responding to low-altitude sea level (C2n = 3.67 ×
10−14 m−2/3). Each data point in Fig. 1A and 1D cor-
responds to a unique phase hologram and far-field dis-
tribution. This data illustrates we have excellent agree-
ment between theory and experiment for turbulence em-
ulated using our SLM setup. Therefore, we are confident
our setup can accurately emulate reproducible turbulence
of various strengths, and we can now attempt a spatial
mode attack in a turbulent channel.
Spatial mode attack in a turbulent channel. We
use our turbulence emulator to study the effect of turbu-
lence on free-space detection efficiency mismatch. The
experimental setup consists of two parts: the turbu-
lence emulator (SLM) and the beam scanning (steering
lens, L1), as shown in Fig. 2. Our source is a 532 nm
continuous-wave laser that is first sent through polar-
ization optics to generate horizontally-polarized light to
ensure phase-only modulation from the SLM. The light
after the SLM has a phase wavefront that represents a
beam that has travelled through atmospheric turbulence.
We use a quarter wave-plate to then rotate the polar-
ization to circularly polarized so there will be a signal
on all four detector channels in the QKD receiver. The
scanning lens, L1, is mounted on a two-axis motorized
translation stage to scan the angle of the outgoing beam.
Finally, we place the receiver 13 m away from L1. The
QKD receiver under test is a prototype for a quantum
communication satellite [6] that has a passive basis choice
to detect polarization-encoded light operating at 532 nm
on four channels: horizontally H, vertically V, diagonally
at +45◦ D or anti-diagonally at −45◦ A.
(A) No turbulence
(B) r0 =7.0cm
(C) r0 =3.5cm 
(D) r0 =2.21cm 
(E) r0 =1.0cm
H V D A Attack angles
FIG. 3. Normalized count rates for each detector at different
incoming beam angles, and the corresponding attack angles
for different turbulence strengths. The color of the attack
angles denote which detector: dark red: H-detector, red: V,
yellow: D, light-blue: A, green: overlap between H and V
detectors.
During the receiver alignment procedure, we first send
a beam through the center of the lens, L1, to optimize and
equalized the detection rates of all four detectors (along
dashed line shown in Fig. 2). This initial alignment
represents normal operation between Alice (sender) and
Bob (receiver). We then adjust the position of lens L1,
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TABLE I. Efficiency mismatch parameters for hacking data
shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. δk = minimum detection effi-
ciency ratio, τk = detection efficiency lower bound.
Turbulence r0
δk τk
H V D A H V D A
None 4 4 35 7 0.4 0.08 0.8 0.1
7.0 cm 2 3 30 3 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5
3.5 cm 1.5 1.5 5 3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.6
2.21 cm 1.5 1.4 3.5 3 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.5
1.0 cm 1.3 2 1.5 1.5 0.5 0.05 0.4 0.5






















FIG. 4. Optimized quantum bit error rate (QBER) as a func-
tion of transmission loss for different turbulence strengths.
and record the detection efficiencies for different angles.
The scan is performed in 90µrad steps covering a range of
±3.6 mrad, which corresponds to a lateral displacement
of ±48 mm at the front lens of the QKD receiver.
Our procedure follows the same method as described in
[1] to find the potential attack angles where one channel
has more probability to click than the other. In our at-
tack model, Eve is restricted to today’s technology and
using a weak coherent state as her source. The attack
angles shows in the right most plot of each sub figure
Fig. 3, for example, the scan results without turbu-
lence, Fig.3(A), for the H detector, the attack angles
are where the H detector has a probability of clicking at
least 4 times higher than D or A detectors (δH = 4),
and the normalized detection probability is greater than
0.4 (τH = 0.4). The ratios for the other channels are
shown in Tab. I. These parameters were then used in an
optimization program to find a set of mean photon num-
bers that Eve could use for her resent signal to match
Bob’s expected detection probability while minimizing
the quantum bit error rate (QBER).
To simulate the attack under turbulence, we sequen-
tially cycle through a subset of phase holograms on the
SLM for each attack angle. We assumed that Eve can
measure and correct the tip/tilt component of turbulence
using adaptive optics. The final normalized detection effi-
ciency of each detector, ηk, is the weighted sum of the de-
tection rates that resulted from each hologram. We then
repeated this process for different turbulence strengths
from very weak to strong turbulence corresponding to
low-altitude sea level. The attack angles and respective
parameters are shown in Fig. 3(B)-(E) and Tab. I.
It can be seen that the stronger turbulence is, the
weaker the mismatch ratio (δk) and the normalized de-
tection rate at each angle becomes. As a result, the op-
timized QBER for an attack under strong turbulence is
higher overall. The minimized QBER under attack as a
function of transmission loss between Alice and Bob is
shown in Fig. 4. If we assume that the QBER threshold
is 8 %, then the attack without turbulence is successful
when the transmission loss between Alice and Bob is less
than 22 dB. The weakest turbulence, r0 = 7.0 cm, only
slightly affects this result, and looks very similar to the no
turbulence case. The strongest turbulence Eve can suc-
cessfully attack is r0 = 3.5cm when the transmission loss
is lower than 10 dB. This turbulence strength is equiv-
alent to Eve having her resent setup 250 m away from
Bob’s receiver at sea level. Further more, the result for
r0 = 2.21cm shows that there is no case where the trans-
mission loss between Alice and Bob is low enough where
Eve can attack without inducing a QBER that exceeds
the threshold. Lastly, for r0 = 1.0 cm, the mismatch ra-
tio is too small (δ ≤ 2 for all channels). Therefore, the
optimization program could not find a solution for an
optimal QBER for any transmission loss.
Conclusion. In this study, we successfully emulated
atmospheric turbulence in a lab environment using a
phase-only spatial light modulator, and demonstrated
a spatial mode detection efficiency mismatch attack in
a turbulent channel. We showed the overall trend for
the effectiveness of an attack under different turbulence
strengths. We found that Eve can attack a free-space
non-decoy state BB84 system from up to 250 m away at
sea level. Our result implies that if Alice and Bob can es-
tablish a secure zone of approximately 250m around this
particular receiver system, then both parties can still ex-
change a key that is secure from this type of attack.
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